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Article 
Unconscious Racism Revisited: 
Reflections on the Impact and Origins of  
“The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection” 
CHARLES LAWRENCE III 
Twenty years ago, Professor Charles Lawrence wrote “The Id, The Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism.”  This article is 
considered a foundational document of Critical Race Theory and is one of the 
most influential and widely cited law review articles.  The article argued that the 
purposeful intent requirement found in Supreme Court equal protection doctrine 
and in the Court’s interpretation of antidiscrimination laws disserved the value of 
equal citizenship expressed in those laws because many forms of racial bias are 
unconscious.  Professor Lawrence suggested that rather than look for 
discriminatory motive, the Court should examine the cultural meaning of laws to 
determine the presence of collective, unconscious racism.  In this Article, 
Professor Lawrence discusses the origins and impact of his groundbreaking 
article.  He notes that while an increasingly conservative Supreme Court majority 
has ignored his call to recognize the presence of unconscious racism and to 
consider the meaning of cultural text, an important body of research and 
scholarship has emerged to substantiate his assertion concerning the ubiquity of 
unconscious racial bias.  He applauds the work that has advanced our 
understanding of unconscious bias, but he expresses concern that this 
scholarship’s focus on the mechanisms of cognitive categorization rather than on 
the history and culture of racial subordination embedded in our unconscious may 
have undermined the central lesson of his article: to advance the understanding of 
racism as a societal disease and to argue that the Constitution commands our 
collective responsibility for its cure. 
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Unconscious Racism Revisited: 
Reflections on the Impact and Origins of  
“The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection” 
CHARLES LAWRENCE III∗ 
PROLOGUE 
The Headline reads, “Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans 
for Integration.”  
WASHINGTON, June 28—With competing blocs of 
justices claiming the mantle of Brown v. Board of Education, 
a bitterly divided Supreme Court declared Thursday that 
public school systems cannot seek to achieve or maintain 
integration through measures that take explicit account of a 
student’s race. 
Voting 5 to 4, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts, Jr., invalidated programs in Seattle and 
metropolitan Louisville, Ky., that sought to maintain school-
by-school diversity by limiting transfers on the basis of race 
or using race as a “tiebreaker” for admission to particular 
schools. 
Both programs had been upheld by lower federal courts 
and were similar to plans in place in hundreds of school 
districts around the country.  Chief Justice Roberts said such 
programs were “directed only to racial balance, pure and 
simple,” a goal he said was forbidden by the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection. 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race,” he said.  His side of 
the debate, the chief justice said, was “more faithful to the 
heritage of Brown,” the landmark 1954 decision that 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Haverford College, 1965; J.D., 
Yale Law School, 1969.  My thanks go to James Forman, Mari Matsuda, and Lama Abu-Odeh for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, to the contributors to this Symposium for their 
thoughtful engagement with my work, and to Jonathan Small for his excellent research assistance.  
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declared school segregation unconstitutional.1 
I am in Hawaii, six time zones away from the scene of the crime.  Our 
New York Times will not arrive until evening, and I’m reading this news on 
my web browser.  I sit staring at the screen, trying to figure out what I’m 
feeling.  I’m stunned and disappointed, but it’s much more than that.  I feel 
assaulted, as if someone has caught me by surprise and hit me in the gut.  
I’m trying to catch my breath, to gather my wits, to pull myself together 
before this guy hits me again.  I’m angry at myself, thinking, “What’s 
wrong with you, Lawrence?  Why are you letting this thing get to you?”  
It’s not like it was a sneak attack.  I’d seen it coming from the moment I’d 
heard the Court had taken cert.2  Back in December I’d sat in my office and 
listened to the oral argument.  I could hear the Court majority’s 
commitment to white supremacy, as much in their voices as in the content 
of their questions.3  I could have written Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
that very day—the rape of Brown v. Board of Education and the claim that 
she had consented,4 the assault on her already badly beaten body,5 and the 
                                                                                                                          
1 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.  
2 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908), Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of 
Educ., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-
915). 
3 See Charles R. Lawrence III, Anatomy of an Oral Argument: The Racial Meaning of Things Said 
and Unsaid, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (exploring the cultural meaning of the texts—and 
silences—of the oral arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools and Meredith to ask how 
the Court conveys its belief in white supremacy even as it requires that we not speak “out loud” about 
race and racism) (on file with author and Connecticut Law Review). 
4 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts claimed the mantle of Brown to strike down the 
school integration programs.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 
2738, 2765 (2007) (“Again, this approach to racial classifications is fundamentally at odds with our 
precedent, which makes clear that the Equal Protection Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not groups’ . . . . 
This fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to Brown itself.”) (quoting Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) [hereinafter PICS].  Not content with 
misrepresenting the court’s own precedent, the Chief Justice claimed that Thurgood Marshall and the 
team of lawyers who argued Brown embraced his reading of the of the Equal Protection Clause.  See id. 
at 2767 (“The parties and their amici debate which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown, but 
the position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been clearer: 
‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to American 
children on the basis of their color or race.’”).  
5 The Supreme Court had already retreated from its commitment to integration.  See generally 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
1461 (2003) (noting the Supreme Court’s role in hindering desegregation efforts); GARY ORFIELD & 
SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION (1996).  For example, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court held that Detroit could not remedy 
its de jure segregation through a school integration plan that included surrounding white suburbs unless 
the suburbs had also perpetrated de jure segregation.  Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721–22, 744–
45 (1974); see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Segregation “Misunderstood”: The Milliken 
Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15 (1977).  The Court further demonstrated its disregard for 
integration in a series of cases lifting desegregation orders even when the effect of lifting the order 
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defamation of her principles and of those who had labored for her birth.6  I 
could see it coming like a tidal wave, like the torches of the Klan riding in 
the night.  Why, then, was I caught with my guard down, so poorly 
defended?  Why, even now, was I trying to figure out what hit me?  Why 
was I feeling as if I too had been beaten and violated? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The editors of the Connecticut Law Review have done me a great 
honor.  They have assembled an esteemed group of judges, litigators, 
activists, and scholars and asked that they consider whether an article that I 
wrote twenty years ago may have asked a question, begun a conversation, 
or offered an insight that has influenced their own good work or had an 
impact on the way we think about law, science, the human mind, race, and 
power.  They have asked me to open this retrospective by reflecting upon 
and evaluating my own work.  I find this task more than a little daunting.  I 
understand that if I have gained some status as an elder among 
constitutional scholars and Critical Race Theorists,7 I may have done so 
primarily through my efforts and good fortune to just stay alive.  But 
staying alive is no mean task for a black man in America,8 so I’ll gladly 
                                                                                                                          
would cause resegregation.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–02 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 
U.S. 467, 495–96 (1992); Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 
(1991).  The result has meant the resegregation of American schools.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 
1597, 1622 (2003) (“Tragically today, America has schools that are increasingly separate and 
unequal.”). 
6 See PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2782 (“[M]y view was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated 
Brown.”). 
7 My life’s work is writing and teaching about constitutional law and critical race theory.  See, 
e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection]; Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 437–38 [hereinafter Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go]; CHARLES R. 
LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 5–7 (1997).  This work is heavily cited in judicial opinions and scholarly writing.  See Ian 
Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Interpreting Legal Citations: Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite 
Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 432–33, 434 (2000) (listing The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection as the first or second most-cited law review article of all-time); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-
Cited Legal Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 769, 777 (1996) (listing The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection as the sixty-first most cited law review article of all-time and If He Hollers Let Him 
Go as one of the most-cited articles published in 1990); see, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
332–33 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection); Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1496 (2005); Frank I. Michelman, Brown at Fifty: 
Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South 
Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1383 n.30 (2004); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, 
Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1351, 
1355 (1991). 
8 Blacks bear a disproportionate risk of disease, injury, death, and disability in the United States.  
CDC, HEALTH DISPARITIES EXPERIENCED BY BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICANS: UNITED STATES, 54 
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take credit, if only for that.  
This essay seeks to understand and articulate the injury that racism or 
white supremacy and its reiteration in the law does to African Americans, 
to other people of color, and ultimately to us all.  I have tried to make this 
work my vocation.9  As teacher, activist, and scholar I have aspired to the 
tradition of radical teaching that historian Vincent Harding has named 
“The Word.”10  “The Word” articulates and validates our common 
experience.  It seeks the reasons for oppression.  It is the practice of 
struggle against dehumanization.  This is the tradition that inspired my 
work in 1987, and it guides my effort in this essay.  I cannot reflect on The 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection outside of the context of this larger 
vocational aspiration. 
I begin this piece, as I did The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, with 
narrative.11  In both narratives I am considering a text, and in each 
narrative I tell of my response to the text, of the thoughts and feelings the 
text evokes.  Both texts are filled with racial images.  The exaggerated 
broad noses, thick lips, and unkempt hair on the visages of Little Black 
Sambo and his parents, Mumbo and Jumbo, reveal the consciously 
embraced white supremacist ideology of the late 19th century, when the 
                                                                                                                          
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5401.pdf; CDC, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2004, at 147 tbl.29 
(2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus04trend.pdf#03.  In 2004, the life expectancy 
for black males in the United States was 69.5 years, compared to 75.7 years for white males.  U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 76 tbl.101 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/vitstat.pdf.  Blacks also experience significantly 
higher infant mortality rates.  Id. at 82 tbl.109; CDC FACT SHEET, RACIAL/ETHNIC HEALTH 
DISPARITIES (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/fs040402.htm.   
9 I explore this vocational aspiration in Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: 
Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2236–37 (1992). 
10 See VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA, 
at xviii–xxi, 82 (1981) (recounting the history of black radicalism in America).    
11 The prologue to The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection begins with the following description of 
my experience as a kindergartener at a predominately white private school in New York: 
It is circle time in the five-year old group, and the teacher is reading us a book.  
As she reads, she passes the book around the circle so that each of us can see the 
illustrations.  The book’s title is Little Black Sambo.  Looking back, I remember 
only one part of the story, one illustration: Little Black Sambo is running around a 
stack of pancakes with a tiger chasing him.  He is very black and has a minstrel's 
white mouth.  His hair is tied up in many pigtails, each pigtail tied with a different 
color ribbon.  I have seen the picture before the book reaches my place in the circle.  
I have heard the teacher read the “comical” text describing Sambo's plight and have 
heard the laughter of my classmates.  There is a knot in the pit of my stomach.  I feel 
panic and shame.  I do not have the words to articulate my feelings—words like 
“stereotype” and “stigma” that might help cathart the shame and place it outside of 
me where it began.  But I am slowly realizing that, as the only black child in the 
circle, I have some kinship with the tragic and ugly hero of this story—that my 
classmates are laughing at me as well as at him.  I wish I could laugh along with my 
friends.  I wish I could disappear. 
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 317. 
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book first was published.12  The story in the Court’s opinion in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools (hereinafter “PICS”) is also filled with the 
faces of Black children and their parents.13  This contemporary text paints 
the black faces with the abstract language of constitutional doctrine.  
Words like “suspect classification,”  “compelling state interests,” and 
“narrow tailoring” describe no noses or lips.  Chief Justice Roberts says he 
sees no color (blackness) in these families’ faces, except that which the 
school districts’ plans have painted and the Constitution compels him to 
erase.14  But I see the faces of the children who trigger racial tie-breakers 
and from whom white families flee.15  I see the faces of the parents who 
                                                                                                                          
12 HELEN BANNERMAN, THE STORY OF LITTLE BLACK SAMBO (Grant Richards 1st ed. 1899). 
13 Of course, the heroine in Chief Justice Roberts’s story is white—the white mother denied the 
chance to send her daughter to the school of her choice, the best school, the white school.  The white 
victim of discrimination stands at center stage in Justice Roberts’s story, but the black faces that stand 
offstage give the story meaning.  
14 Consider the following quotes from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion:   
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than 
working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the 
purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. We have many times 
over reaffirmed that “[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.” 
PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2757 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 513 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)). 
“Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception of race is an extreme 
approach in light of our precedents and our Nation’s history of using race in public schools, and 
requires more than such an amorphous end to justify it.”  Id. at 2760. 
“Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to 
discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less 
exacting scrutiny.”  Id. at 2765. 
“For schools that never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the 
vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way ‘to achieve a system of determining 
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis’ . . . is to stop assigning students on a racial basis.”  
Id. at 2768 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)).   
Roberts never mentions the race of the children he says have been “segregated,” “classified,” 
“assigned,” “balanced,” and “discriminated” against.  In this way he separates each word from the 
context that gives them meaning.  
15 Segregation in public schools has been exacerbated by “white flight” from the urban housing 
market.  In PICS, Justice Breyer noted in dissent that the school district integration plans were in part 
aimed to discourage “white flight.”  PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2828 (“Nor could the school districts have 
accomplished their desired aims (e.g., avoiding forced busing, countering white flight, maintaining 
racial diversity) by other means.”).  Justice Breyer also cited a report describing the importance of the 
link between housing and education policy.  Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: 
Impacts on Metropolitan Society, in PURSUIT OF A DREAM DEFERRED: LINKING HOUSING AND 
EDUCATION POLICY 121 (John A. Powell et al. eds. 2001).  An amicus brief submitted by Housing 
Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations explained that “[w]ithout question, the federal 
government and individual housing authorities played an active and deliberate role in concentrating 
poverty in the racially segregated public housing they created” which has resulted in, among other 
things, segregated public schools.  Brief for Housing Scholars and Research & Advocacy Organizations 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, PICS, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915); 
see also SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 103 (2004); Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction: The 
Interstates and Central City Housing, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN 
URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 226, 226–45 (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 
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know that no one will fix the leaking roof at their children’s school or 
repair the toilets or teach advanced placement Calculus and Chemistry, 
unless there are also white children there.16  I see the faces that Justice 
Roberts would render colorless, and they are black like my face.  They, and 
I, look nothing like the characters in Little Black Sambo, but neither did 
our great grandparents in 1890.17   
As I read each of these texts, I know I am not reading alone.  The other 
children in my kindergarten class have seen how Sambo is portrayed and 
noticed his kinship to me.18  Although few Americans will read the full text 
of the Chief Justice’s opinion, most will hear some version of his story.  
The feelings of humiliation, anger, powerlessness, and disappointment I 
experience as I read the new desegregation decision are caused not so 
much by the text itself as by my knowledge that this text is read by a larger 
community and by the meaning that community will give it. 
I first used the term “cultural meaning” in The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection.19  Although scholars most often read and cite the article for its 
introduction of the theories and science of unconscious motivation to the 
discussion of equal protection doctrine,20 the cultural meaning of racial  
                                                                                                                          
2000) (describing how the Interstate Highway system destroyed low-income housing and helped 
further “residential segregation agendas”).  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given short shrift to 
the importance of this link.  See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974) (striking down a 
city’s public school integration program because it involved surrounding white suburbs). 
16 See Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations:  On Race, Privacy, and Community (A 
Continuing conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy) 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1395 (2005) 
(discussing the ways that poor minority children who attend integrated schools benefit by the social and 
political capital that middle class and white parents bring to those schools); see also RICHARD D. 
KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CHOICE 47 (2001). 
17 Racial imagery and iconography has long been associated with racial ideology in the United 
States.  See JANETTE LAKE DATES & WILLIAM BARLOW, SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE 
MASS MEDIA 3 (1990) (discussing the struggle to control images of African Americans in mass media 
in order to maintain the ideological hegemony of white supremacy); CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK, 
RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE (1990) (discussing the treatment of 
African American characters and themes in literature and film from the Civil War era to the mid 
1980s); STERLING A. BROWN, THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN FICTION 1–4 (1969) (identifying racial 
stereotypes of African Americans in American fiction and noting the difference in treatment of African 
American fictional characters by white and black authors). 
18 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 317 (“[I] am slowly 
realizing that, as the only black child in the circle, I have some kinship with the tragic and ugly hero of 
this story—that my classmates are laughing at me as well as him.”). 
19 See id. at 355–56 (“I propose a test that would look to the ‘cultural meaning’ of an allegedly 
racially discriminatory act as the best available analogue for and evidence of the collective unconscious 
that we cannot observe directly.”). 
20 See, e.g., Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for 
Discrimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 268 n.4 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 n.11 (1995); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991). 
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texts remains, for me, the central and most important idea in the article.21  
Perhaps I am at fault for giving the article a title that so provocatively 
evokes the outsized personage and controversial theory of Sigmund Freud, 
but my primary project in that article was not to explain or promote any 
particular theory of the unconscious.22  Rather, I was most concerned with 
exploring how white supremacy is maintained not only through the 
intentional deployment of coercive power,23 but also through the creation, 
interpretation, and assimilation of racial text.24 
                                                                                                                          
21 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 358 (“Indeed, 
construction of text is the most basic of judicial tasks.  And while most judicial interpretation involves 
determining the meaning of written text, legal theorists have recognized that meaningful human 
behavior can be treated as a ‘text-analogue.’”); see also id. at nn.188–89 (“‘In spoken discourse, the 
subjective intention of the speaker and the objective meaning of the discourse overlap, while with 
written discourse the meaning of the text is disassociated from the mental intention of the author and 
the two no longer coincide.  Likewise, spoken discourse ultimately refers to the contextual situation 
common to the speaker and the listener.  Texts, on the other hand, speak about the world.  The text 
frees itself from the reference of the particular situation in which its author speaks and creates its own 
universe of references.’”) (quoting PAUL RICOEUR & JOHN B. THOMPSON, HERMENEUTICS AND THE 
HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, ACTION AND INTERPRETATION 200–02 (1981)). 
22 See Kang, supra note 7, at 1496 n.28 (“Lawrence’s work is consistent with the claims of this 
Article, broadly stated.  Moreover, its exploration of unconscious racism, based on psychology, is a 
crucial intellectual precursor.  However, social cognition is a very different psychology from that of 
Freud and psychoanalysis.”); Krieger, supra note 20, at 1164 n.11 (“Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, 
Professor Lawrence argues that much of what is classified as disparate treatment discrimination results 
from subconscious instincts and motivations.”). 
23 At the time, critical legal studies scholars were focusing on how legal ideology and 
consciousness induces consent to racial oppression.  See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 
1350–55 (1988) (“The concept of hegemony allows Critical scholars to explain the continued 
legitimacy of American society by revealing how legal consciousness induces people to accept or 
consent to their own oppression.”).  This line of thinking ignored important aspects of racial 
domination through coercion.  See id. at 1357 (“The Critics’ principal error is that their version of 
domination by consent does not present a realistic picture of racial domination.  Coercion explains 
much more about racial domination than does ideologically induced consent.  Black people do not 
create their oppressive worlds moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in worlds created 
and maintained by others.”). 
24 See generally R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 860 (2004) (“Minstrelsy—an entertainment form that showed white performers 
in blackface mocking the stereotypical black characters—produced additional stereotypes, to include 
the lazy, wise-cracking Sapphire woman and the elederly [sic], crippled, and shuffling Jim Crow.  The 
Harlem Renaissance produced vastly improved (if still imperfect) depictions of African-American life, 
as did the Civil Rights movement and more recent efforts by African Americans and others in music, 
literature, and cinema.  But the negative stereotypes and images far outnumber those that are positive 
and have proved far more enduring.  One can see modern analogues of the Sambo, black beast, Jezebel, 
and Sapphire tropes in ads and televisions shows from the 1970s, 1980s, and even the 1990s.”); see 
also Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 56 (1994) (“Racial ideology, for example as 
embodied in segregation, powerfully sculpts communities in U.S. society.”); MICHAEL OMI & 
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S, at 78 
(1986) (noting the role of the state in racial formation and ideology); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ideology As a 
Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 193, 231 (Basic Books, Inc. 1973) (exploring 
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This Article revisits that exploration with the benefit of twenty years of 
hindsight.  I begin with the origins of the article.  My comrade in Critical 
Race theory, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, once asked, “What was it you 
hoped to do in writing this piece?”  Part II answers that question.  I explore 
personal, political, professional, and analytic motivations and goals, 
without drawing sharp lines of demarcation between these interrelated 
inspirations and purposes.  In Part III I ask, “What have they done with my 
song?”  What has this article wrought?  How has it been received, 
understood, misunderstood, embraced, rejected and employed?  What has 
been its influence, or lack thereof, on the Supreme Court, on dominant 
constitutional discourse and on the law’s response to the “American 
Dilemma”?25  How have the ideas I introduced in this article been applied 
by social scientists, litigators, judges and other scholars?   
Part III contains two subparts.  In Part A, I offer an account and 
critique of how an increasingly conservative Supreme Court majority has 
not only ignored my scholarly intervention but has marched relentlessly 
and radically, not to mention intentionally, in the opposite direction of my 
call to give attention to the meaning of racial text.26  This doctrinal march 
to re-segregation in the name of “colorblindness” culminates in the recent 
Seattle and Kentucky desegregation decisions.27  In The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection, I challenged the Court’s refusal in Washington v. Davis 
to ask whether there was constitutional injury in the cultural meaning of 
racially discriminatory impact.  In PICS, the Court’s majority strikes down 
two voluntary school desegregation plans, asserting that all facially racial 
classifications must receive strict scrutiny.  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
for the majority offers no coherent explanation for this rule.  Instead, he 
proclaims it settled doctrine.  This rule gains authority through the Court’s 
power to proclaim its truth.  It achieves the pretense of reason only by 
taking the question of racial meaning off the table.  Desegregation can only 
inflict the same injury as segregation if we ignore the question of what 
each signifies. Only in this Alice in Wonderland world, where racial 
                                                                                                                          
the nature of ideology in societies and defining ideology as “that part of culture which is actively 
concerned with the establishment and defense of patterns of belief and value”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
25 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY lxxi (1962) (“The ‘American Dilemma,’ referred to in the title of this book, is the ever-
raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall 
call the ‘American Creed,’ where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high 
national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual 
and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; 
considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or 
types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.”). 
26 See infra notes 56–75 and accompanying text. 
27 See PICS, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2767–68 (2007) (“What do the racial classifications do in these 
cases, if not determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?”). 
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classifications are devoid of meaning, can a remedy to the injury identified 
in Brown v. Board of Education28 become the injury itself.29 
Part B discusses some of the considerable and important body of 
research and literature that has emerged since the advent of my article.  
Cognitive psychologists have  employed carefully constructed research and 
sound scientific methodology to substantiate my article’s assertion that we 
are all influenced by racial bias, much of which we are unaware.  Legal 
scholars, including Linda Krieger, Jerry Kang, Devon Carbado, and 
others30 have drawn on this social science and made the work accessible to 
lawyers and civil rights activists who have, in turn, used it well to do the 
important political work of educating the courts and the public about the 
                                                                                                                          
28 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
29  The incoherence and absurdity of the Court plurality’s reasoning is made apparent by a line of 
questioning at oral argument in Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education.  Justice Ginsburg 
asks plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Gordon, how the school district’s desegregation system that he is 
challenging “compares with the system that was in effect from . . . 1975 until 2000.”  (A federal district 
court had ordered this plan as a remedy having found that the School District had unconstitutionally 
segregated its schools.)   
Mr. Gordon: I’m sorry.  It’s the same remedial program that—this court has 
found . . . that when the remedial program has achieved its result we should no 
longer carve out that exemption under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Justice Ginsburg: Do you think there’s something of an anomaly there, that you 
have a system that is forced on the school that it doesn't want it, works for 25 years, 
and then the school board doesn’t have to keep it any more, but it decides it's 
worked rather well, so we’ll keep it.  What’s constitutionally required one day gets 
constitutionally prohibited the next day. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) 
(No. 05-915). After Mr. Gordon fumbles thorough several unsuccessful attempts to answer Justice 
Ginsburg’s question, Justice Scalia comes to his rescue. 
Justice Scalia: Mr. Gordon, isn’t it the case that once you’ve achieved unitary 
status, which means that the effects of past intentional discrimination have been 
eliminated, the only way you can lose unitary status is to discriminate intentionally?  
Isn’t that right? 
Id.  Justice Souter then takes up the questioning asking if there is not an important difference between a 
court’s finding of “unitary status” (a legal construction) and a “unitary condition” (a descriptive term).  
Justice Souter asks, “is the preservation of a unitary condition a legitimate or indeed a compelling 
governmental objective?”  Id. at 5.  Justice Breyer makes a final attempt to reveal the illogic of the 
legal fiction upon which the plaintiff’s, and ultimately Justice Robert’s plurality opinion rests. 
Justice Breyer: Now, the question from a constitutional point of view that you’re 
being asked is how could that Constitution which says that this is intolerable, that 
segregated school, and insists that the school boards in Swann and elsewhere take 
black children and white children and integrate them?  How could the Constitution 
that day that that decree is removed tell the school board it cannot make that effort 
any more, it can’t do what it’s been doing and we’ll send the children back to their 
black schools and their white schools. 
Id. 
30 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 
(2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064–66 (2006); Kang, supra note 7, at 1493–95; Linda 
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit 
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003–08 (2006); Krieger, supra note 20, at 1164–
65. 
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role of the unconscious in discrimination.  I express my gratitude for this 
good work.  However, I argue that, while this scholarship’s focus on the 
mechanisms of cognitive categorization has taught us much about how 
implicit bias works, it may have also undermined my project by turning 
our attention away from the unique place that the ideology of white 
supremacy holds in our conscious and unconscious beliefs.  I find this 
outcome unfortunate, if unintended, as the ubiquity and invidiousness of 
racism was the central lesson of my article.  I further express my fear that 
cognitive psychology’s focus on the workings of the individual mind may 
cause us to think of racism as a private concern, as if our private implicit 
biases do not implicate collective responsibility for racial subordination 
and the continued vitality of the ideology and material structures of white 
supremacy.  In its most extreme manifestation, this view of implicit bias, 
as evidence only of private, individual beliefs, is expressed as a right to be 
racist.31  Part III closes by noting a paradox.  The Court’s use of legal 
formalism to repress our consciousness of racism has converged with 
psychologists’ efforts to explain the origins of unconscious bias, and this 
convergence has served to undermine my article’s chief purpose: to 
advance the understanding of racism as a societal disease and to argue that 
the Constitution commands our collective responsibility for its cure. 
II.  THE ARTICLE’S ORIGINS: WHAT DID I HOPE TO DO? 
I first met Professor Mari Matsuda32 in 1981 at a small gathering of 
legal scholars of color at the University of Pennsylvania.  I was presenting 
a work in progress that contained the seeds of the argument that became 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection.33  Professor Matsuda recalls that, in 
introducing that piece and explaining the process of its conception, I said, 
“I write so I know I’m not crazy.”  I do not remember saying this, but it is 
surely true.  I may have also said, “I hope that my writing will help other 
people know that they are not crazy,” for that has also been a primary 
motivation in my scholarship.  I trace this motivation, and thus the origins 
                                                                                                                          
31 This seems to be the position taken by my colleague in this Symposium, Amy Wax, in her 
article and in an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal.  Amy Wax, The Discriminating Mind: 
Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN L. REV. 979 (2008); Amy Wax & Philip E. Tetlock, We Are All Racists At 
Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A16, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
32 Professor Matsuda and I have enjoyed a close professional and personal collaboration, having 
co-authored two books, LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 7, MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES 
LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERELE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993), and shared the 
joys and challenges of a loving marriage and two beautiful children.  
33 I first explored the ideas which eventually found voice in The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection, when writing a review of David Kirp’s book, JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL 
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1982).  Charles R. Lawrence III, “Justice” or “Just Us”: 
Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 841–43 (1983). 
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of this article, to my experience in law school.  I was one of only three 
black students in my first year class, and I recall expending considerable 
intellectual and emotional energy in an effort to maintain my sanity as I 
struggled to make sense of a discursive world that rarely reflected my lived 
experience.  I did not have the work of Critical Race Theorists like Derrick 
Bell, Kim Crenshaw, Patricia Williams, Jerry Lopez, and Mari Matsuda to 
provide me with an analysis that explained the dissonance between that 
lived experience and the way the dominant legal discourse described the 
world.34  So I wrote to keep from going crazy, to explain to myself and 
others why the legal analysis of race that my professors, and later my 
colleagues, presented as wise and just often struck me as foolish or evil.  
And, I wrote with the hope that in my own struggle to understand what was 
making me crazy I might help all of us understand the insanity of white 
supremacy.   
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was conceived in this struggle 
for sanity.  I knew from my own intuition and experience that racism 
achieved its injury through the production and reproduction of hierarchy, 
power, and material conditions of subordination determined by race.  I 
knew that this production of material and structural subordination is 
achieved not only through coercion35 but also by the creation and 
transmission of an ideology that justifies those coercive practices and 
conditions.  As Kendall Thomas has said, “We are raced.”36  
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection began as a critique of 
Washington v. Davis37 and of the doctrine of discriminatory purpose 
                                                                                                                          
34 Although I did not have the benefit of the work of critical race scholars in the legal academy, I 
was taught and inspired by a host of critical race scholars including Herbert Aptheker, James Baldwin, 
Gwendolyn Brooks, Harold Cruz, Martin Delany, Fredrick Douglas, W.E.B. Dubois, St. Clair Drake, 
Frantz Fanon, John Hope Franklin, Lorraine Hansberry, Langston Hughes, Zora Niel Hurston, 
Staughton Lynd, Martin King, Ira Ried, Paul Robeson, Walter Rodney, Carter G. Woodson, and 
Malcolm X.  
35 See Crenshaw, supra note 23, at 1369–87 (noting, in a section entitled “The Context Defined: 
Racist Ideology and Hegemony,” that white supremacy is achieved not just through the internalization 
of hegemonic ideology but also through coercive violence and economic subjugation); Ian F. Haney 
López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
985, 1053 (2007) (“Racism and sexism gain social meaning and destructive power from the ubiquitous 
deployment of force, violence, degradation, coercion, and dominance, not merely through the tendency 
to make distinctions on the basis of criteria outside individual control.”). 
36 Professor Kendall Thomas describes how racism acts as both speech and conduct.  It is speech 
in that it refers to a socially constructed idea or meaning derived from a history of oppression.  It is 
conduct in that it is perpetuated and reinforced through an ongoing process of contemporaneous speech 
and acts.  In this respect, racism is less a noun and more a verb.  Thus, he says: “We are raced.”  
Kendall Thomas, Nash Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Law & Culture 
at Columbia Law School, Comments at Panel on Critical Race Theory, Conference on Frontiers of 
Legal Thought, Duke Law School (Jan. 26, 1990).  
37 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976). 
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established in that decision.38  I joined many other critics of that decision 
who condemned Davis for placing a heavy and often impossible burden on 
plaintiffs seeking constitutional protection from racially discriminatory 
practices and conditions.39  However, I wanted to make the more 
fundamental argument that Davis was wrong because the injury of racial 
inequality exists irrespective of the motives of the defendants in a 
particular case.  I believe that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments 
embody a moral and constitutional duty to act affirmatively to disestablish 
the practices, institutional structures, and ideology of slavery and white 
supremacy.40  I wanted to demonstrate that Davis’s motive-centered 
inquiry, its requirement that we identify a perpetrator, a bad guy wearing a 
white sheet and hood, made no sense if equality was our goal. 
I also wanted to formulate a response to a question that I was asked by 
white liberal friends whenever we talked about race. “Why should 
‘innocent’ whites pay the costs for remedying racial discrimination for 
which they were not responsible?”  The question appeared in the 
euphemisms of sophisticated anti-affirmative action arguments, in stories 
                                                                                                                          
38 The legal doctrine first established in Davis requires plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality 
of a facially neutral law to prove a racially discriminatory purpose or intent on the part of those 
responsible for the law’s enactment or administration.  Davis, 426 U.S. at 240–41. 
39 See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Foreword: Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Need for 
Self-Help, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 682–83 (1977) (discussing the Davis test as “eroded to an 
irreparable degree”); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of 
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 39–40 (1977) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Davis “unwisely confine[d] heightened scrutiny”); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050, 1115–16 (1978) (commenting on the lack of validation of the test in Davis); 
Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 49–50 (1977) (discussing the “purpose doctrine” in the context of race); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of 
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1989) (discussing the discriminatory purpose 
requirement in Davis); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541, 543 (1977) (discussing the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Davis); Michael A. Reiter, Compensating for Race or National Origin in Employment 
Testing, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 687 (1977). 
40 I have elsewhere described my view of this constitutional imperative:  
My own theoretical framework and the discussion in this article presume that the 
Reconstruction Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause embody a 
constitutional norm or value of antisubordination.  The meaning of this value can be 
understood only in the context of a culture, nation, and Constitution that for more 
than a century affirmatively embraced the values of slavery and white supremacy.  
Thus, I believe the Equal Protection Clause does more than require that every 
individual have equal access to the democratic process and does more than grant 
blacks the right to treatment free of invidious racial motives. Rather, it creates a new 
substantive value of “nonslavery” and antisubordination to replace the old values of 
slavery and white supremacy. 
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1382; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the 
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824–25 (1995) (proposing racial equality as a 
“substantive social condition rather than an individual right”). 
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about a son who didn’t get into Harvard,41 of immigrant ancestors who had 
never owned slaves,42 and in less refined outbursts like, “Some of my best 
friends are black,” but I always heard the question’s meaning loud and 
clear.  My friends were saying, “Why me? I’m not a racist.”   
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, I had participated in a newly militant 
civil rights movement that called for structural and institutional changes 
that went beyond formal equality and addressed the social and economic 
conditions of poor people of color.  We used words like white supremacy, 
institutional racism, and colonialism to name these conditions.43  By the 
time I was writing The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, the backlash 
                                                                                                                          
41 These arguments have found their way into legal doctrine as well.  For example, in Regents of 
Univ. of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court said that the harm of “societal discrimination” is too 
“amorphous” for there to be a remedy.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 
(1978) (“That goal was far more focused than the remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’ 
an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”); see also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (“Like the claim that discrimination in primary 
and secondary schooling justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous 
claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an 
unyielding racial quota.”).  The Court also rejected the notion that the “innocent,” or those not found to 
have perpetrated racial discrimination, should be disadvantaged because of past discrimination 
perpetrated by others.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (“We have never approved a classification that aids 
persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent 
individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or 
statutory violations.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (“Disparate treatment of white 
and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record 
the remedy must be limited to that system.”).   
42 These arguments reflected an emerging narrative which transformed the discussion from a civil 
rights story linked to slavery to a story about competing racial and ethnic groups.  See Haney López, 
supra note 34, at 990 (“This competing narrative suggested that racial subordination was largely past 
and that social inequalities, if any, reflected the cultural failings of minorities themselves, while further 
postulating that there existed no dominant white race as such, but instead only a welter of competing 
cultural groups defined in national origin terms, for instance, Irish- or Italian-Americans.”); Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 292 (“[T]he United States had become a Nation of minorities.  Each had to struggle—and to 
some extent struggles still—to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a 
‘majority’ composed of various minority groups of whom it was said—perhaps unfairly in many 
cases—that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups.”).  The story about a 
“nation of minorities” became an attractive historical revision to a majority looking to assuage its guilt 
and avoid penance.  See JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS 
OF INEQUALITY 157, 209–10 (1979); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (“[I]t is more than a little ironic 
that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling 
to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.”) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
43 For a history of this movement and examples of this discourse, see generally VOICES OF 
FREEDOM, AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 349–586 (Henry Hampton and Steve 
Fayer eds. 1990); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 433–459 (1980); 
ROBERT L. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: AN ANALYTIC HISTORY 1–3 (1969);  
STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION (1967); 
MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND 
IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–2006 (3d ed. 2007); JULIUS LESTER, LOOK OUT, WHITEY! BLACK POWER’S 
GON’ GET YOUR MAMA! xi–xii (1968); THE BLACK POWER REVOLT 10 (Floyd B. Barbour ed. 1968); 
MALCOLM X, MALCOLM X SPEAKS (1965).   
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against Black power and Black Nationalism was in full sway.44  My white 
liberal friends were saying, in effect, “I’m tired of being called a ‘white 
honky.’  I just don’t like being called a racist.”  I understood the intent of 
this request that I not defame them with the same pejorative label I would 
use to describe a Nazi or KKK member, and that I reaffirm our friendship 
by acknowledging that we both stood against racism.  I always felt 
conflicted at this point in the conversation.  I wanted to respond positively 
to their good faith commitment to racial equality, but I had also heard in 
their plea for a “good white folks” pass a demand that I do something more 
than not call them a bad person.  They were asking me to delete the words 
“white supremacy” from our conversation, to take the question of our 
collective racism off the table, to refrain from asking whether their white 
privilege implicated them in the structures and conditions of racial 
inequality, to exempt them from responsibility for America’s racism.  This 
I could not do. 
My answer to this dilemma was to refuse to issue “good white folks” 
passes, to say, “Sorry, my friend.  You are a racist and so am I.”  The chief 
insight of The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was gained from my 
realization that I could not respond to my friends’ first request (that I 
refrain from calling them racist) without also giving them a pass on the 
second request—to remove from the agenda the issue of our implication in 
America’s racism.  I understood that the second request was necessarily 
contained within the first.  They wanted a pass on their own racism and on 
their participation in America’s racism as well. When my friends said they 
didn’t want to be called racist, they were also saying they didn’t want to be 
held responsible for society’s institutional and structural racism.   
The defendant in Washington v. Davis had asked the Supreme Court 
for the same free pass on racism as my friends had asked of me.  And, of 
course, the Court gave the defendants that free “good guy” pass on both 
questions.  Only intentional racists were deemed to violate the 
constitutional value of racial equality.  But the Court, in Davis, did much 
more than give the named defendants a free pass.  It held that, because the 
defendants were not intentional racists, no constitutional violation had 
occurred, even though the facts showed dramatic racial inequality.45  The 
rest of us were held guiltless as well, all of us exculpated from any 
responsibility for society’s institutional and structural racism, because no 
                                                                                                                          
44 For a discussion of the backlash against black militancy of this period, see DREYFUSS & 
LAWRENCE, supra note 42, at 141–61, and STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM 
RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 97–175 (1995). 
45 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976) (“[W]e have difficulty understanding how 
a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory 
and denies ‘any person . . . equal protection of the laws’ simply because a greater proportion of 
Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.”). 
 2008] UNCONSCIOUS RACISM REVISITED 947 
intentional racist planned the unequal result.  While blacks continued to 
suffer from conditions of inequality, none of us were to blame.46  
My goal in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was to expose and 
challenge the way that the Court had, with this single opinion, declared the 
reconstructive work of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments accomplished.  
The Supreme Court, by conflating the issue of bad motive with that of 
constitutional and moral injury, had given my friends and colleagues the 
exoneration they were seeking from me.  I wrote The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection to say to my friends, “Just because the Court gave you 
the answer you wanted to hear doesn’t mean it’s a good answer.  Just 
because the Court’s answer has let you off the hook, do not think that you 
can claim allegiance to the struggle against racism.”   
My method was to decouple the question of whether my friends were 
good or bad people from the question of our responsibility for our own 
racism.  I argued that if the Equal Protection Clause prohibited government 
decisions determined or influenced by our continued adherence to an 
ideology of white supremacy, then Davis had created a false dichotomy 
between the “evil” acts of avowed racial bigots and the “innocent” acts of 
good people.  If the constitutional value at stake is anti-slavery or anti-
white supremacy, then that value is violated whenever a decision is 
determined by our belief in white supremacy.  And if the decisions of the 
avowed racial bigot and my good white friends were all influenced by our 
belief in white supremacy, the presence or absence of bad intent was 
irrelevant to the question of whether those decisions violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.47   
The final piece of my argument, that bad intent and constitutional 
injury must be decoupled, asserted the ubiquity of racist belief and the fact 
that often we are not even conscious of the fact that we hold those beliefs.  
In the most often quoted passage of the article I said, “[A]mericans share a 
historical experience that has resulted in individuals within the culture 
                                                                                                                          
46 This places the Court’s jurisprudence firmly within what Alan Freeman calls the “perpetrator 
perspective,” which holds that the goal of antidiscrimination law is to root out individual instances of 
discrimination in a world otherwise free from discrimination.  This perspective “denies historical 
reality—in particular, the fact that we would not have had antidiscrimination law had it not been for the 
historical oppression of particular races.”  Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989: 
Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 288 (David Kairys ed. 
3d ed. 1998).  In contrast, the “victim perspective” focuses on the social and economic conditions 
associated with our specific history of discrimination and measures the success of antidiscrimination 
law against the actual equality it produces.  Id. at 285–311; Freeman, supra note 39, at 1050–52. 
47 I recognize, as I did then, that my choice to center my argument on the influence of the 
unconscious on an individual’s decision-making meant that I was accepting the Court’s motive-
centered inquiry, albeit for the limited purposes of engaging my friends and colleagues within the 
dominant legal paradigm and proving Davis’s intent doctrine incoherent on its own terms.  For a 
discussion of my motivations for and ambivalence about this choice, see infra notes 52–55 and 
accompanying text.    
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ubiquitously attaching a significance to race that is irrational and often 
outside their awareness.”48 
In support of this assertion, I turned to the considerable body of theory 
and research in psychology and social science that hypothesized and 
offered evidence for the presence of perceptions, beliefs, and ideas of 
which we are unaware but, nonetheless, influence our actions and 
decisions.  I devoted a significant part of the article to introduce these 
disciplines to an audience that had paid scant attention to their implications 
for constitutional theory,49 and it is for this part of my argument that the 
article is most often cited.50 
I asked my readers to think of America’s racism as a public health 
problem, as a disease that required anti-racists to adopt the mindset and 
methodology of epidemiologists rather than that of policemen.51  I hoped 
that by pointing out that we were all infected with racism I would at least 
remove the very stigma that caused my friends to deny their racism, and at 
the same time help them recognize that the injury of racism was found in 
symptomatic material conditions, including inequalities of wealth, 
employment, schooling, health, incarceration, etc., and in the ideology that 
produced and justified those symptomatic material conditions. 
I had another purpose that shaped the content and form of the article.  I 
was determined to challenge the Supreme Court and proponents of the 
discriminatory purpose requirement on their own terms.  I wanted to prove 
that my argument against the discriminatory intent requirement did not 
require agreement with my more radical position that the Fourteenth 
Amendment embodies a constitutional norm or value of anti-subordination, 
to demonstrate that, even if we judged the Davis doctrine by the measure 
of mainstream liberal theories of equal protection, the doctrine did not 
serve the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose.  I devoted a significant 
segment of the article to this task, examining two leading constitutional 
theories that justified the application of heightened scrutiny to 
                                                                                                                          
48 Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 327.  Justice Brennan quotes 
this passage in full in the body of his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 360 n.13 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (citing generally 
to Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7).  I think that I can safely say Justice 
Brennan’s quote brought attention to my Article that it might not have otherwise received.   
49 Part I of The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection was subtitled, “A Primer on the Unconscious 
and Race.”  Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 328.   
50 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (“In an influential article published in 1987, Professor Charles Lawrence 
urged the legal system to ‘reckon[] with unconscious racism.’  His article relied on both Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory and the findings of cognitive psychologists to argue that unconscious bias is a 
pervasive aspect of everyday life.”). 
51 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 331 (“We must 
understand that our entire culture is afflicted, and we must take cognizance of psychological theory in 
order to frame a legal theory that can address that affliction.”). 
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governmental decisions based on race, (the “process defect theory” and the 
“stigma theory”), and arguing that the distinct harm that each theory posits 
is more completely revealed and addressed if the theory incorporates a 
recognition of unconscious as well as conscious motives for racist acts.52  
Because each of these theories assumed that the harm of race 
discrimination derived from intentional motive, I challenged the theories 
by asking that they not ignore what science had taught us about the 
influence of the unconscious on human motivation.53  My proposal here 
was quite modest: rather than arguing that the harm of racism existed 
irrespective of motivation, I chose to speak within the motivational 
paradigm of the dominant liberal constitutional theory.  As a law professor 
writing for a law review, it seemed the most effective way to be heard.  
However, my choice to engage liberal legal theory on its own terms is 
often incorrectly read to infer my acceptance of the normative principle 
and interpretation of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause upon 
which that theory is premised.54  Both Ely’s process defect theory and 
                                                                                                                          
52 Briefly stated, process defect theory takes the position that judicial review of legislative action 
is legitimate insofar as it seeks to reinforce democratic values by correcting defects in the political 
process.  See id. at 345–49 (giving an overview of the theory); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980) (“[I]t is an appropriate function of the Court 
to keep the machinery of the democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of 
political participation are kept open.”).  John Hart Ely, a chief proponent of this theory, notes that racial 
discrimination is one manner in which the political process gets distorted.  Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 346.  The courts, however, only look for a process defect and 
apply strict scrutiny when a legislature makes a facial racial classification or when overt racism has 
been proved under the Davis test.  Id. at 347.  This completely ignores the destructive effect of 
unconscious racism on the political process.  Thus, in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I argue 
that Ely’s process defect theory “stops an important step short of locating and eliminating the defect it 
has identified.”  Id. at 349.  Stigma theory likewise attaches undue significance to the distinction 
between conscious and unconscious racism.  Stigma theory posits that racial classifications should be 
strictly scrutinized when they serve to shame and degrade a class of persons as inferior.  Id. at 349–50.  
This was at the heart of the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown holding that segregated schools are 
inherently unequal.  Id. at 350.  The injury inflicted by stigmatization flows from the meaning society 
attaches to an action or classification.  Thus, the evil racist intent of individual actors, although perhaps 
sufficient, is certainly not necessary to inflict the harm of stigma.  Nonetheless, as I note in The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection, many advocates and scholars who embrace stigma theory have been 
extremely hesitant to suggest expanding equal protection analysis much beyond laws which are 
apparently race-dependent.  Id. at 353–54.  
53 See Krieger, supra note 19, at 1164 n.11 (“Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, Professor 
Lawrence argues that much of what is classified as disparate treatment results from subconscious 
instincts and motivations.”). 
54 See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original 
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 91–92 (“[Charles Lawrence] attempted to cast his argument in the 
shadow of the arguments by traditional liberals, such as John Hart Ely and Paul Brest, and to respond to 
the more radical arguments of Alan Freeman.  However, his efforts to tie his worldview into the 
liberals’ critiques of current court and legal dogma fail precisely because these critiques ultimately take 
for granted the perspective of the white world.”).  Legal scholars such as Linda Krieger and Jerry Kang 
have described their work as building on my own and distinguished my work from their own primarily 
by my emphasis on psychoanalytic rather than cognitive theory.  To the extent that their work adopts 
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Brest’s anti-stigmatization thesis ascribe to the Equal Protection Clause a 
principle that disfavors race-dependant conduct.  The argument for 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to embrace this principle requires 
that one identify a substantive value that explains why race-dependent 
political choices violate the principle and race-neutral choices do not.  Ely, 
Brest, and the justices in Washington v. Davis find that substantive value in 
the antidiscrimination principle which they read as a value against conduct 
infected by prejudice or bias.  Simply put, this principle finds a normative 
wrong in conduct motivated by prejudice toward a racial group.  
I challenged the Davis intent requirement and the internal coherency of 
these theories by arguing that they only accounted for conscious prejudice, 
and that unconscious motives were also a source of this wrong.  I believe I 
succeeded in this challenge.  But my desire to prove Davis incoherent on 
its own terms and to frame my argument so that my colleagues would find 
it more accessible and acceptable undermined my initial and primary 
purpose.   
My own view of equal protection’s central principle and command is 
very different from that which finds the harm to equality in the mind and 
motivation of individuals.  I believe the Equal Protection Clause embodies 
a constitutional norm or value of anti-subordination.55  In recent years I 
have stated this belief more forthrightly and with more clarity than I did in 
1987.  For example, in Forbidden Conversations I write: 
My own theoretical framework and the discussion in this 
article presume that the Reconstruction Amendments and the 
Equal Protection Clause embody a constitutional norm or 
value of anti-subordination.  The meaning of this value can 
be understood only in the context of a culture, nation, and 
Constitution that for more than a century affirmatively 
embraced the values of slavery and white supremacy.  Thus, I 
believe the Equal Protection Clause does more than require 
that every individual have equal access to the democratic 
process and does more than grant blacks the right to 
treatment free of invidious racial motives.  Rather, it creates a 
new substantive value of “non-slavery” and anti-
                                                                                                                          
the liberal paradigm, they have also read me to implicitly accept the dominant white worldview.  See 
Kang, supra note 7; Krieger, supra note 22.  For an expanded discussion of how legal scholars 
employing cognitive theory remain within the dominant liberal legal paradigm see infra notes 83–111 
and accompanying text. 
55 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 
U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 775–78 (1997) (explaining the necessity of interracial collaboration in achieving 
anti-subordination); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 7; Charles R. Lawrence III, Two 
Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 
950–51, 962 (2001) (defining and defending anti-subordination theory as indispensable to individual 
equality and dignity). 
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subordination to replace the old values of slavery and white 
supremacy.  Given the historical and cultural context of the 
Amendments’ adoption, I believe the Constitution cannot be 
understood to establish these new values but not implement 
them.  Such a reading renders the Amendments without 
substance.  If the Reconstruction Amendments replace the 
constitutional value of slavery with the value of non-slavery, 
the Equal Protection Clause requires the disestablishment of 
the ideology, laws, practices, and structures that were put in 
place in service of slavery and white supremacy.  It requires a 
reconstruction of the substantive societal conditions that 
slavery created.56 
In The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I spoke of the “cultural 
meaning” of an allegedly racially discriminatory act as the “best available 
analogue for and evidence of the collective unconscious that we cannot 
observe directly.”57  My reference to the “collective unconscious” rather 
than the individual actor’s unconscious was meant to convey my belief that 
the harm resided in the continued existence of a widely shared belief in 
white supremacy and not in the motivation of the individual actor or actors 
charged with discrimination.  So long as this shared ideology remains we 
must assume that the affirmative command of the Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause to abolish white supremacy has not been accomplished.  
In retrospect, I believe that while my effort to demonstrate the 
limitations of Davis on its own terms may have advanced the utility of the 
article for litigators and teachers of traditional constitutional theory, it also 
may have undermined the central goal of my project.58   
III.  WHAT HAVE THEY DONE WITH MY SONG?: 
TWO RESPONSES TO THE ARTICLE 
A.  Racism Repressed: The Supreme Court as Societal Super Ego 
When I wrote The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I was not so 
naïve that I expected I would persuade the Court to recognize the error of 
its ways and reject the Davis intent requirement in a subsequent case.  It 
was apparent to me, even then, that the Court was declaring its intention to 
                                                                                                                          
56 Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1382–83. 
57 Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 324. 
58 In my own defense, I must point out that even in 1987, I recognized this tension between the 
liberal frame I adopted in this Part of the Article and my own view and spoke of it in the last Part of the 
Article.  Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 381–87; see Culp, supra 
note 54, at 47–48 (“Black scholars knew, in exactly the way the black domestic did, that certain claims 
were outside the bounds of discourse. . . .  Black legal scholars have faced a history of not being heard, 
or of being heard selectively.”). 
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retreat as quickly as possible from the radical reasoning of Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County59 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,60 
cases that acknowledged the still vital legacy of slavery and Jim Crow and 
recognized that justice required the affirmative disestablishment of the 
institutions and structures of white supremacy.61  For the Court to heed my 
call for attention to the cultural meaning of racially discriminatory acts 
would require its adherence to the substantive vision of racial justice set 
out in Green and Griggs.  The Court had made an about face in Davis.  It 
would stage a rapid and relentless retreat from the fight against white 
supremacy,62 and that retreat required the Justices to blind themselves and 
us to the racial meaning of our acts.   
The progress of this march away from racial meaning is most evident 
in the affirmative action cases, but it begins in Washington v. Davis itself.  
Justice White’s opinion for the majority in Davis argues that the Court 
must require proof of intentional racism before applying strict scrutiny 
because an impact test would prove unworkable.  He argues that an impact 
test would be “far reaching”63 and might require the court to “invalidate a 
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing 
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black 
than the more affluent white.”64  In other words, we cannot subject every 
governmental action with disproportionate impact to strict scrutiny, 
because many of these actions are not the product of racism.   
But why not require strict scrutiny of just those cases where the harm 
can be traced to white supremacy’s continuing presence?  Justice White 
offers no explicit answer to this question, but the answer his argument 
implies is clear: “Because we cannot tell when racism is at work and when 
it is not.”  What follows from Justice White’s assertion that we cannot 
know racism when we see it is Davis’s doctrinal rule that we may only 
treat racially discriminatory conditions and outcomes with suspicion when 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, Va., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968) 
(“School boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless 
clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a 
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”) (emphasis 
added); see also Lawrence, supra note 5, at 34–40 (discussing the importance of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Green). 
60 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of 
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 
‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”). 
61 See Freeman, supra note 39, at 1093 (noting that “Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court’s first 
substantive decision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is as close as the Court has ever 
come to formally adopting the victim perspective”). 
62 See generally id. at 1114–17; see also Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
1971, 1987–89 (1990). 
63 Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
64 Id. 
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government actors employ racial classifications on the face of a statute or 
when plaintiffs prove those actors intended to achieve a racial result.  
Accordingly, it is the use of racial classification, or attention to race, not its 
connection to white supremacy, that the court finds suspicious.  Justice 
White explains his decision to not strictly scrutinize actions with racially 
discriminatory impact by claiming he cannot tell whether they are racist or 
not, and then holds that the Court must strictly scrutinize all facially racial 
classifications without asking whether we have any reason to believe they 
are racist in intent.  In both cases, the Court declines to ask the question, 
“Does the government action reinforce the structures and ideology of white 
supremacy?”  In The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I condemned 
Washington v. Davis for the Court’s refusal to consider the racial meaning 
of discriminatory impact, but Davis also marks the beginning of a series of 
cases that assert and establish as doctrine the incoherent, unprincipled, 
Orwellian notion that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates equality but 
prohibits consideration of the presence or absence of white supremacy. 
Although I argue in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection that we are 
often unaware of the racism that motivates our actions, the Supreme Court 
majority’s refusal to see society’s racism is quite intentional.  In 
McCleskey v. Kemp, a case decided within months of the publication of my 
article, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the 
administration of Georgia’s death penalty statute.65  Plaintiff had proffered 
a statistical analysis of the sentences in more than two thousand murder 
cases that demonstrated that defendants charged with killing whites were 
4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with 
killing blacks.66  Although Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged the validity of plaintiff’s regression analysis demonstrating 
the statistical disparity could be explained by no other factor than racial 
bias,67 the Court nonetheless said it could not see race at work.  “[W]e 
decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious,” said Justice 
Powell.68  In Davis, Justice White argues that the Court must require intent 
because it cannot tell when discriminatory impact is caused by racial bias.  
In McCleskey the Court simply “declines” to do so.  “There is some risk of 
racial prejudice influencing a jury’s decision in a criminal case,” says the 
Court, “the question is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally 
unacceptable.”69  A friend of mine who represents defendants in death 
                                                                                                                          
65 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
66 See id. at 286–87 (“McCleskey proffered a statistical study performed by Professors David C. 
Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth (the Baldus study) . . . .  One of his models concludes 
that, even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims 
were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.”). 
67 Id. at 291 n.7. 
68 Id. at 313. 
69 Id. at 308–09. 
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penalty cases calls McCleskey the “so what” case.  The Court says, “OK, 
so you’ve shown that more likely than not this defendant’s death sentence 
was influenced by racial prejudice.  So what?” 
Regents v. Bakke marks the first case where Justice White’s argument 
for intent in Davis (that we must require proof of intent because we cannot 
tell when discriminatory impact implicates racism) appears together with 
its doctrinal fraternal twin (that we must strictly scrutinize even remedial 
racial classifications because how else will we know that they are not 
invidious). 
In Bakke, Justice Powell rejects the remedial purpose of ameliorating 
“societal discrimination.”70  “It’s too ‘amorphous,’”71 he says.  What is it 
that makes amorphous discrimination inappropriate for remedy?  Powell 
cannot mean that we should not seek to remedy societal discrimination 
because there is too much racism or because it is too widespread.  No, 
Justice Powell declares “societal discrimination” is off limits for race-
conscious remedy for the same reason that Justice White refuses to 
recognize racism in racially discriminatory impact.72  His claim is that he 
can’t be sure it’s racism.73  Moreover, the Court holds in Bakke that all 
laws that employ racial classifications on their face must be strictly 
scrutinized.  Why?  The Court’s answer in Bakke, Croson, Adarand, 
Gruter and PICS is the same: because we cannot tell if this racial 
classification is invidious or benign.  We do not know whether it is 
employed for good or bad reasons.74 
Note that in Davis uncertainty about the cause of racially subordinating 
impact leads to the default position of no suspicion of racism.  In the 
affirmative action and recent desegregation cases, uncertainty about the 
motives of those attempting to remedy racial subordination leads to the 
default position of suspicion of racism.  I think I have already made it clear 
that I do not buy the Court majority’s claim to myopia.  To paraphrase 
                                                                                                                          
70 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978). 
71 Id. at 307. 
72 Id. at 310. 
73 Id. at 307–10. 
74 See id. at 298 (“[I]t may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.”); see 
also PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2764 (“Our cases clearly reject the argument that motives affect the strict 
scrutiny analysis.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“‘Absent searching judicial inquiry 
into the justification for such race-based measures,’ we have no way to determine what ‘classifications 
are benign or remedial and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial 
inferiority or simple racial politics.’”) (quoting City of Richmonds v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493 (1989)); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (“We adhere to that view today, 
despite the surface appeal of holding ‘benign’ racial classifications to a lower standard, because ‘it may 
not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign.’”) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298); 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (“Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based 
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and 
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.”). 
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Justice Stevens’s words in Adarand,75 I think Justice O’Connor and her 
colleagues really do know the difference between a “keep out sign” and a 
“welcome mat.”76   
But I want to point out something even more disturbing about the 
move the Court has made in these cases.  By claiming not to be able to 
know when racism or white supremacy is at work, they have removed the 
question of white supremacy’s presence from the doctrine that applies the 
Equal Protection Clause to questions of race.  The Court presumes a law 
that produces discriminatory impacts is benign without ever asking 
whether that discriminatory impact furthers white supremacy.  Facially 
racial classifications are presumed invidious, again without asking whether 
the classification perpetuates white supremacy or operates to disestablish 
American Apartheid.  We have the 14th Amendment only because we had 
slavery and a war that ended slavery.  The origin is anti-racist, the Court’s 
interpretation is not. 
The recent decision striking down school desegregation plans in 
Seattle and Kentucky77 represents the culmination and nadir of this ruthless 
march away from my call to recognize the cultural meaning of government 
action as a way of discovering whether that action represents the 
continuing influence of white supremacy.  Only in a world where racial 
discrimination is devoid of any meaning can Justice Roberts equate the 
segregation in Brown78 with the integration in PICS.79  When Justice 
Roberts says, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race,”80 he asks us to deny our 
knowledge of the real meaning of race and racism in America.  He asks us 
to repress our knowledge of 380 years of slavery and segregation.  He asks 
us to believe that race consciousness is what violates the Constitution, not 
racism. 
                                                                                                                          
75 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
76 Justice Stevens found “untenable” Justice O’Connor’s assumption that there is no consistent 
way to distinguish between racial classifications which place a burden on a minority race and those 
which seek to bestow a benefit or those which are invidious and those which are benign.  See id. at 243.  
Indeed, as Justice Stevens explains, Justice O’Connor’s position runs contrary to common sense.  See 
id. at 245 (“It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall’s 
confirmation in order to keep African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with President 
Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s race as a positive factor.  It would equate a law that made black 
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers.”).  
Consequently, Justice Stevens quips that “[t]he consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the 
difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”  Id. 
77 PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2738. 
78 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
79 PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2738. 
80 Id. at 2768. 
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B.  A Two-Edged Sword: The Emerging Science of Implicit Bias 
During the twenty years since The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection 
was published, behavioral scientists have made significant advances in the 
study of unconscious racism.  Recent social cognition research has 
provided stunning evidence to support my assertion that we are all infected 
with racial bias and that often that bias resides outside of our awareness.81  
In 1994, researchers at Yale University and the University of 
Washington devised the Implicit Association Test.82  The Implicit 
Association Test measures unconscious racial bias by linking together 
words and images to reveal what associations come most easily to mind.  
When you visit the IAT web site, you are asked to classify a series of faces 
into two categories, African American and European American.  You must 
then mentally associate the white and black faces with words such as “joy” 
and “failure.”83  You must take the test under considerable time pressure 
                                                                                                                          
81 For an overview of this body of scientific research and theory, see generally Anthony 
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 
(2006).  See also Anthony Greenwald et al., A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-
Esteem, and Self-Concept, 109 PSYCHOL REV. 3 (2002); Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).  
82 The IAT was developed by Dr. Mahzarin Banaji, now at Harvard University, and Dr. Anthony 
Greenwald of the University of Washington and their colleagues.  See Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; Erica Goode, A 
Computer Diagnosis of Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at F7, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, NYT File; Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, 
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring 
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998). 
83 Greenwald and Krieger describe the mechanics of the test: 
The most widely used IAT measure assesses implicit attitudes toward African 
Americans (AA) relative to European Americans (EA). In this “Race IAT,” 
respondents first practice distinguishing AA from EA faces by responding to faces 
from one of these two categories with the press of a computer key on the left side of 
the keyboard and to those of the other category with a key on the right side of the 
keyboard. Respondents next practice distinguishing pleasant-meaning from 
unpleasant-meaning words in a similar manner. The next two tasks, given in a 
randomly determined order, use all four categories (AA faces, EA faces, pleasant-
meaning words, and unpleasant-meaning words). In one of these two tasks, the IAT 
calls for one response (say, pressing a left-side key) when the respondent sees AA 
faces or pleasant words, whereas EA faces and unpleasant words call for the other 
response (right-side key). In the remaining task, EA faces share a response with 
pleasant words and AA faces with unpleasant words.   
The implicit-attitude measure produced by this IAT is based on relative speeds of 
responding in the two four-category tasks. This measure allows an inference about 
attitudes (category-valence associations) because it is easier to give the same 
response to items from two categories when those two categories are cognitively 
associated with each other. For American respondents taking the Race IAT, 
response speeds are often faster when EA, rather than AA, is paired with pleasant 
words. This frequently observed pattern supports the interpretation that EA-pleasant 
is a stronger association than AA-pleasant. Researchers have described this result as 
showing implicit attitudinal preference for EA relative to AA. 
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 81, at 952–53. 
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using your computer keys to respond to the pairings.  If you take the test 
too slowly the web site indicates that you have defaulted and must begin 
the test again.  These tests have been taken by more than two million 
people.  An analysis of tens of thousands of these tests taken anonymously 
on the Harvard web site found that eighty-eight percent of white people 
had a pro-white or anti-black implicit bias; nearly eighty-three percent of 
heterosexuals showed implicit bias for straight people over gays and 
lesbians; and more than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim testers 
displayed implicit biases against Arab Muslims.84   
Implicit bias research also supports my observation that the victims of 
white supremacy often internalize racial bias directed against them.  Forty-
eight percent of blacks showed a pro-white or anti-black bias.  Claude 
Steele’s groundbreaking research on stereotype threat provides more 
evidence of the debilitating effects of internalized racism on even high 
achieving black students.85  In a striking adaptation of Steele’s 
experiments, researchers at Harvard found that Asian women math majors 
performed better on math tests when they were prompted to think of 
themselves as Asian and worse when they thought of themselves as 
women.86 
This cognitive research has also shown that implicit bias against 
African Americans and Arabs predicts policy preferences on affirmative 
action and racial profiling.87  This suggests that implicit attitudes affect 
                                                                                                                          
84 Vedantam, supra note 82. 
85 Psychologist Claude Steel describes the “stereotype threat” as a fear that by performing poorly 
on exams minority students risk reinforcing negative racial stereotypes associated with race and 
intelligence.  The deployment of these racial stereotypes creates self-doubt and results in lower test 
scores.  Thus, the stereotypes become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Claude Steel, Thin Ice: “Stereotype 
Threat” and Black College Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44; Claude M. Steele, A 
Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 613–18, 620–22 (1997); Claude Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and 
the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 
797–98, 800–01, 805–06, 808 (1995); see also Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA 
L. REV. 417, 456–57 (2007) (summarizing one of Steel’s studies demonstrating this phenomenon with 
black students). 
86 Social psychologist Margaret Shih had three groups of Asian American women at Harvard 
University fill out different questionnaires designed to be subtly suggestive of different social identities 
(i.e., female or Asian).  The subjects were then asked to take a math test.  Those given the questionnaire 
triggering an Asian identity performed best; the control group came in second; and the group given the 
female identity questionnaire last.  In other words, having the Asian identity triggered boosted 
performance whereas cuing the female identity lowered scores.  Kang, supra note 7, at 1492–93, 1521–
22; Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative 
Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80–83 (1999). 
87 See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1065–66 (2006) (stating that the presence of implicit bias 
creates discrimination by causing merit to be mismeasured); see also Vedantam, supra note 82 
(explaining that “bias against blacks and Arabs predicts policy preferences on affirmative action and 
racial profiling”). 
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more than personal preference or snap judgments.  They also play a role in 
positions arrived at after careful consideration such as the policy choices of 
legislators, policemen, and employers.88   
Legal scholars, including Linda Krieger, Jerry Kang, Richard Banks, 
Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Cass Sunstein, have explored the 
implications of this new science for the adjudication of allegations of 
discrimination, for shaping public policy and for understanding broader 
patterns of disadvantage in our society.89  Linda Hamilton Krieger’s 
groundbreaking article, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment, introduced the 
science of cognitive bias to employment discrimination lawyers, 
demonstrating that a large number of biased employment decisions result 
not from discriminatory motivation (either conscious or unconscious) but 
from unintentional categorization-related judgment errors.90  This scholarly 
work has in turn been employed by lawyers who have educated judges 
about unconscious bias even as they have argued anti-discrimination cases 
within the limited doctrinal regimes that focus on motive rather than 
impact,91 and by advocates who have sought directly to educate employers, 
educators, health care workers, and political constituencies about the 
importance of recognizing unconscious racism in the fight for equal 
justice.92 
I welcome and celebrate this important work.  When I first assigned 
                                                                                                                          
88 Krieger, supra note 20, at 1169–70, 1173, 1177, 1181–82, 1200–01, 1210. 
89 R. Richard Banks, Discrimination and Implicit Bias In A Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 1169, 1170–71 (2006); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 701–04 (2001); Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1260–62, 1267–70 (2000); Kang, supra note 7, at 1491–95; Krieger, supra 
note 20, at 1165.  
90 Krieger, supra note 20, at 1165. 
91 To date The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection has been cited in sixteen judicial decisions, 
including one United States Supreme Court case, five decisions of the federal Courts of Appeals, eight 
federal district court cases, and by the state supreme courts of Alaska and Minnesota.  These citations 
have covered a broad range of cases and legal issues, including: criminal law, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 332–33 (1987), U.S. v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827–28 (9th Cir. 1992); Chin v. Runnels, 
343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004); U.S. v. Burroughs, 897 F. Supp. 205, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1995); 
United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 779 n.25 (E.D. Mo. 1994); Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 
467, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State, 110 P.3d 947, 963 n.62 (Alaska 
2005); Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 575 n.1 (Minn. 1994); education, see 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 863 n.28 (10th Cir. 1989); employment discrimination, see 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 
302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M. D. Ala. 2004); Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 1 F. Supp. 2d 
783, 801 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515–16 (D. Me. 1991); and 
immigration, see Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994). 
92 See, e.g., Equal Justice Society, EJS and California Teachers Association Collaboration on 
Unconscious Bias Project, http://www.equaljusticesociety.org/newsletter5/story5.html (last visited Apr. 
1, 2008) (discussing the pilot Project in Davis, California that will review “current research of 
unconscious bias in education and . . . any current research on [the] impact of bias within the 
classroom” and conduct “‘collaborative inquiry project’ within the Davis School Community”). 
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The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection to my constitutional law classes, 
many students found my claim that we all harbored unconscious bias 
difficult to accept.  They found the theoretical work and anecdotal 
examples I cited unconvincing and argued that if my own experience 
differed from theirs this was indicative of the considerable difference in 
our ages.  They were careful not to call me old, but they said that they had 
grown up in a post-civil rights world where race no longer mattered.  I was 
disappointed but not surprised by this reaction.  After all, for these young 
people the “colored” and “white” signs on drinking fountains I saw as a 
child were ancient history.  This post-Bakke generation was raised on a 
steady diet of the carefully selected excerpts from Dr. King’s “I have a 
dream” speech.  When I kidded them by referring to them as “white folks,” 
expressions of surprise and betrayal crossed their faces because I’d noticed 
their race and said it out loud.  Now when I teach Washington v. Davis93 I 
include a link to the IAT site94 alongside the link to my article.  Although 
my students may claim the test is unfair or poorly constructed, the 
scholarly literature proves the methodology unimpeachable and they must 
directly confront the proof of their own unacknowledged bias.  Part I of 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, subtitled “A Primer on the 
Unconscious and Race,” would look very different were it written today.  
If the court victories relying on the cognitive research have been limited 
and sometimes overruled, the beneficial influence of this important work 
on policy and political discourse is far from trivial.  If my article in some 
small way inspired this work or paved the way for its application to anti-
discrimination law, I can count myself as having contributed to something 
good. 
But there is also something that troubles me about the way the research 
and scholarship of behavioral scientists describes and explains unconscious 
racism.  Even as this science has done much to establish, prove, and 
quantify the presence of individual unconscious bias, it has also served to 
undermine the central purpose of my article.  Recall that my first goal for 
this project was to put the subject of racism as white supremacy back on 
the table and to argue that our collective belief in white supremacy and the 
continuing influence of that belief on government policy and decisions 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate of equal protection of the 
law.  I called attention to unconscious racism not so much to make the case 
that each of us as individuals harbored unconscious racist thoughts as to 
make the case for the continued ubiquity of racism in our culture, and to 
argue that if the constitutional value expressed in the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                                          
93 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
94 Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
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Clause required the eradication of behavior motivated (or caused)95 by 
racist beliefs, we needed to treat racism as a societal disorder or sickness.  
We needed to respond to racism as epidemiologists rather than as moralists 
or crime fighters.   
The cognitive behavioral research begins with the goal of 
understanding and demonstrating the source of bias in individuals.  The 
theory that informs this research posits an implicit system or “primitive” 
part of the brain designed for reaction rather than reason.  This system 
specializes in mental shortcuts.  Bias or stereotype occurs because the brain 
works by placing information into categories.  We make stereotyped 
assumptions about others—good or bad—because categories that 
correspond to those stereotypes are created in this primitive part of our 
brain and those categories are available as a place to sort our perceptions.  
People revert to the shortcuts of the implicit system of categorization 
because this is the way our brain processes information.  The theoretical 
claim made by cognitive social psychologists is that stereotypes should be 
understood as no different from other categorization constructs.96  Our 
biases and prejudices result from the same process of categorization, 
assimilation, and search for coherence that underlies all human cognition.97  
The point of this research was to understand the process of 
categorization.  What cognition theory and the implicit bias experiments 
have taught us about the content of those categories is an important by-
product of this enterprise, but incidental to the project’s thesis and purpose.  
Cognitive behavior theory describes categorization as a consequence of the 
natural way that each of us processes information.  Implicit bias is 
biological, normal, automatic, an inevitable product of the workings of an 
individual’s brain.  Cognitive theory sees stereotyping as “simply a form of 
categorization, similar in structure and function to the categorization of 
natural objects. . . . [S]tereotypes, like other categorical structures, are 
cognitive mechanisms that all people, not just ‘prejudiced’ ones, use to 
simplify the task of perceiving . . . .”98   
                                                                                                                          
95 Both anti-discrimination law and cognitive psychologists have used the word  “motivation” to 
mean that discriminatory conduct is intentional—that it originates in the individual’s  or group’s desire 
to harm another individual or group.  Cognitive psychologists view Freudian psychology as 
motivational because Freud theorized an unconscious that has its origins in repressed conscious 
thoughts.  Linda Krieger contrasts her own perspective with my own noting that: “While Professor 
Lawrence does mention cognitive bias as a potential source of discriminatory decision-making, he 
focuses primarily on discussing motivational rather than cognitive antecedents.” Krieger, supra note 
20, at 1164 n.11 (emphasis added). 
96 Krieger, supra note 20, at 1186–88 (citing the work of W. Edgar Vinacke, Stereotypes As 
Social Concepts, 45 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 229, 229–30 (1957) and Joshua A. Fishman, An Examination of 
the Process and Function of Social Stereotyping, 43 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 27, 45–52 (1956)). 
97 Krieger, supra note 20 at 1186–87 (paraphrasing Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 
25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 80–82 (1969)). 
98 Id. at 1188.   
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By focusing on the process of categorization, we normalize bias and 
make the content of white supremacy and the origins of that content 
irrelevant to the analysis.  When the process of categorization, rather than 
the content of the categories, is our central concern, we turn our attention 
away from questions like, “Why is racism so ubiquitous in these 
categories?”  “Why do we form categories that violate the value of human 
equality?” and “Why we should assume collective responsibility for 
correcting the consequences?”  The bias in favor of whites is a prejudice 
like any other preference, the natural product of categorization.  This 
description of the origin of bias suggests an inevitability—“We can’t help 
it, we always categorize,” devolves easily back to, “It’s not our fault.” 
Linda Krieger notes that “[t]he emergence of social cognition theory 
represented a profound shift in psychologists’ thinking about intergroup 
bias.”99  From the late 1940s and into the 1980s, social psychologists 
believed that prejudice consisted of negative beliefs and feelings towards a 
group that in turn caused negative behavior.  Stereotypes of “outgroups” 
were seen as caused by prejudice and serving to rationalize it.  They 
viewed prejudice as irrational, unjustifiable, pathological and abnormal, as 
discontinuous from “normal” cognitive process.  Social cognition theory 
not only saw bias as part of the normal cognitive process, it argued that the 
processes of categorization “might in and of themselves produce and 
perpetuate intergroup bias.”100    
This view that bias or stereotype grows out of the “normal” cognitive 
process of categorization rather than out of learned prejudice suggests that 
none of us is responsible for our bias or for the discriminatory behavior 
that results from that bias.  How can we judge someone blameworthy for 
the normal functioning of the human brain?  But, of course, the process of 
categorization has content.  This content is what defines the categories and 
gives them meaning.  Cognitive theory’s view of unconscious racism and 
the perspective that inspires my cultural meaning test share two important 
insights.  Both speak of racial bias as often operating beyond our self-
awareness and both describe racial bias as normal.  But the theories differ 
in an important way.  When cognitive theorists call racial bias normal, they 
refer to the normalcy of categorization—the fact that we all categorize as a 
way of making sense of the world.  When I say that racism is normal, I 
refer to the ubiquity of racism—to the fact that our categories are filled 
with a specific content: the ideology of white supremacy.   
Mahzarin Banaji, one of the researchers who developed the Implicit 
Association Test, was quoted in a Washington Post article as saying, “The 
Implicit Association Test measures the thumbprint of culture on our minds 
                                                                                                                          
99 Id. at 1187. 
100 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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. . . .  If Europeans had been carted to Africa as slaves, blacks would have 
the same beliefs about whites that whites now have about blacks.”101  Of 
course, Europeans were not carted to Africa as slaves, and Banaji’s 
hypothetical revision of history achieves the same result as Justice 
Roberts’s equating the segregation condemned in Brown with the race-
conscious policies designed to integrate the schools in Seattle.  Cognitive 
research’s focus on the process of categorization, like the Court’s focus on 
the process of classification, skips the question of our responsibility for 
what our history has wrought.  Both turn our attention away from the 
content of the categories and the meaning of that content.  Both take white 
supremacy (and anti-subordination) off the table as the central concern of 
our justice project. 
Cognitive behavior research focuses on individual bias.  We take the 
Implicit Association Test as individuals and it proves that each of us 
harbors racial bias.  Although the researchers count tens of thousands of 
our responses and offer this as evidence that this racial bias is widespread, 
many of my students and as many of my colleagues in the bar and legal 
academy do not think this proves that what we do collectively through the 
state has been infected by bias.  For that, they say, we must prove 
conscious intent.  I have heard no logic to support the argument that 
eighty-eight percent of white people and almost half of blacks may be 
proved to harbor unconscious anti-black bias,102 but that this racism does 
not infect those elected to represent us.  Of course, the state action 
requirement is the doctrinal rule that gives this argument authority,103 but 
that doctrine, like the intent requirement, must have a logic of its own that 
gives it some authority other than that it gains from white power.104  
                                                                                                                          
101 Vedantam, supra note 82. 
102 Id.; Jay Dixit, Screen Test, SLATE, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2134921.  See also 
Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 
6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 102, 105 (2002) (reporting results from 600,000 IATs on the popular online 
website, including significant Black-White IAT results); Greenwald et al., supra note 82, at 1474, 
1478.  
103 By restricting the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to discrimination implicating the 
government, the state action rule immunizes private discriminators from constitutional scrutiny.  See 
The Civil Rights Cases, United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12, 24–25 (1883) (“[The Fourteenth 
Amendment] does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of 
private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws . . . .”); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 536–37 (1985) (“Limiting the 
Constitution’s protections to state action preserves state sovereighty by giving the states almost 
complete authority to regulate private behavior.”).   
104 The doctrine embodies the notion in American life and law that racial discrimination can be 
accurately and properly divided into two spheres: “public” and “private.”  I have critiqued this view 
elsewhere.  See Lawrence, supra note 32, at 847; Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 7, at 
444–452 & nn.60–87; Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1389–90 & nn.79–86; see also Frank I. Michelman, 
Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography 
Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 306 (1989); DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 
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I imagine that there is another unspoken argument or belief embedded 
in my students’ resistance to reading proof of their own racism as sufficient 
to hold us collectively responsible for that racism’s impact.  This argument 
asserts a right to be racist.  If my implicit bias is only the product of my 
mind’s categorization of lived experience, how can you pass moral 
judgment on my prejudice?105  
Legal scholars who have applied cognitive theory to legal problems 
have focused primarily on its usefulness in proving that unconscious bias 
influences an individual decision-maker’s actions and thereby renders 
those actions discriminatory and unlawful.  Anti-discrimination law 
prohibits actions by an employer, police officer, or prosecutor that have 
been tainted by impermissible considerations of race, and the research 
done by cognitive psychologists can demonstrate that these impermissible 
biases are at work even when the decision-maker is unaware of their 
presence.  For example, Linda Krieger’s groundbreaking article, The 
Content of Our Categories, begins with a narrative about a Title VII 
disparate treatment case on which she was working as a lawyer and her 
realization that “something about the way the law was defining or seeking 
to remedy disparate treatment discrimination was fundamentally 
flawed.”106  She locates this flaw in Title VII jurisprudence’s construction 
of discrimination—a construction that “while sufficient to address 
deliberate discrimination . . . is inadequate to address the subtle, often 
unconscious forms of bias that Title VII was also intended to remedy.”107  
Her article’s thesis is that the failure of this construction “stems from the 
assumption that disparate treatment discrimination, whether conscious or 
unconscious, is primarily motivational, rather than cognitive, in origin.”108 
Krieger identifies the law’s failure as a misunderstanding of the 
psychological process that produces bias: The law thinks that 
                                                                                                                          
104–10 (2d ed. 1980).  See generally Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the 
Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 
(1982) (arguing that the distinction between public and private is a fundamental weakness in applying 
state action to labor law). 
105 For an example of this argument, see Wax & Tetlock, supra note 31; see also DINESH 
D’SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 24 (1995); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 17–18, 77 
(1992); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of 
Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25; Richard Cohen, Closing the Door on Crime, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 7, 1986, at W13, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.  I have critiqued this view 
elsewhere.  See generally Lawrence, supra note 16; Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go, supra note 7; 
Lawrence, supra note 32; see also Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a 
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1761–69 (2000).  Of course, the state 
action doctrine formalizes this right by holding that only government must abide by the Constitution’s 
commands. 
106 Krieger, supra note 20, at 1161–64. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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discriminatory treatment is caused by biased motivation when, in fact, the 
origin of discriminatory bias is primarily cognitive—the product of the 
process of categorization.109  While her analysis shifts the psychological 
paradigm from motivation to the structure and process of cognition, the 
legal question remains within the paradigm of individual fault and 
causation.  Unconscious bias is demonstrated to prove an individual’s 
action has been caused at least in part by bias.  Krieger employs cognitive 
theory to challenge and expand Title VII law’s limited understanding of 
the causal relationship between the human mind and human action.  She 
argues that the process of categorization within an individual’s brain 
distorts her perception and that this distortion, rather than invidious motive, 
results in biased and discriminatory decisions that violate the law.  This 
descriptive model tells a more accurate story about the origins of racial 
bias, but the normative and legal injury that Krieger addresses is the one 
identified as doctrinally relevant by the court in Davis and by Title VII’s 
disparate treatment test.  This model understands the statutory, 
constitutional, or normative harm of race discrimination as the biased, and 
therefore wrongful, actions of one individual against another.  Krieger’s 
insight and analysis is a laudable and important intervention for litigators 
who are called upon to tell this true and persuasive story within the 
confines of existing antidiscrimination law, but it should not be confused 
with my own. 
I did not set out to invent a better tool for Title VII litigators.  I sought 
to challenge the disparate treatment paradigm itself.  I argued that racism’s 
harm was greater than the biased actions of individuals.  I pointed to the 
ubiquity of conscious and unconscious racism as evidence of the continued 
vitality of racist ideology and argued that so long as this ideology lived and 
flourished, the Constitution, and normative justice, required that we act 
affirmatively to remedy its effects and disestablish its institutional 
embodiments.  The “cultural meaning” test does not ask whether bias 
infects the decisions of the individual actors.  Rather, it demonstrates the 
continuing presence of racist belief in the larger society by discerning the 
racial (or racist) meaning or interpretation that the relevant community 
would give an act or decision that is not articulated or justified in explicitly 
racial terms.  These are two very different projects.  One accepts the central 
premise of the Davis intent requirement—that the harm of race 
discrimination lies in individual acts infected by bias.  The other rejects 
that premise and finds the harm of racism in the pervasive effects of shared 
racist ideology.  I do not want to diminish the importance of the former 
project, but to the extent that The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection is 
                                                                                                                          
109 Id. at 1165. 
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linked to this limited critique, my more radical purpose is undermined.110 
I am not accusing the authors of this research and scholarship of being 
unconcerned with racism and other forms of group subordination.  The 
research is directed primarily at demonstrating the prevalence of forms of 
bias that motivate and justify behavior that creates and perpetuates racial 
hierarchy and other conditions of dominance and subordination, and it is 
clear that these empiricists seek to advance the cause of 
antidiscrimination.111  What I caution against here is the direct, if 
unintended, consequence of a particular method of describing prejudice.  I 
have described the way this research is read and received by those who 
find it easier to avoid their own implication in and responsibility for 
righting America’s racism.  I think this work is interpreted to suggest the 
most limited and least provocative conclusions for the same reason that 
Americans are so ready to accept Justice Roberts’s unsupported assertion 
                                                                                                                          
110 Professor Amy Wax’s article in this Symposium provides an example of how my argument is 
misunderstood or misrepresented by conflating and confusing it with the excellent but very different 
work of those who have been inspired by and built upon my observation that antidiscrimination law 
should take the role of the unconscious into account.  Professor Wax says that she is writing a response 
to “the work of Charles Lawrence and his acolytes,” but, regardless of how one views the merits of her 
argument, its central thesis is the claim that the causal relationship between demonstrated unconscious 
bias and the alleged discriminatory behavior of employers, law enforcement officers, and other 
individuals has not been proved.  Wax, supra note 31, at 981.  For Wax, “discrimination occurs when 
an individual is victimized by ill treatment that is causally linked to or based on a protected 
characteristic.”  Id. at 985 (emphasis added).  She uses some forty pages to argue that, while the 
cognitive research may have demonstrated pervasive racial bias, these studies have not demonstrated 
that “mental states generate discrimination.”  Id.  Disparate impacts may be attributable to a decision-
maker’s reliance on neutral criteria, such as “‘supply side’ differences” in “groups’ overall ability” or 
“average qualifications” rather than on their biases.  Id. at 1022.   
It may be objected that any group deficiencies in supply side determinants of 
success are themselves traceable to unlawful discrimination and racism—past, 
present, or both.  Nothing here is to the contrary.  But the observation . . . must be 
sharply distinguished from the assertion that a particular company, organization, or 
employer violates anti-discrimination laws by selecting, evaluating, or rewarding its 
employees on the basis of group identity. . . . Employers and economic actors take 
employees as they find them.  That racism has contributed to making some 
employees less qualified does not change the fact that they are less qualified. 
Id. at 1005.  She continues: 
The question of what to do about the legacy of racial discrimination is highly 
charged and controversial.  But the fact that private actors respond to existing 
disparities does not justify treating them as if they are responsible for those 
disparities in the first place. . . . Rectifying past or present injustice by addressing 
“root causes” is a fundamentally different exercise from claiming that a particular 
social actor is discriminating.  
Id. at 1005–06.  Of course, the “objections” and “highly controversial” questions that Wax 
distinguishes as not the subject of her article are objections and debates that I make central.  I argue that 
addressing the “root causes” of racism ought to be the project of antidiscrimination law.  The “cultural 
meaning” test directly asks whether any “group deficiencies in supply side determinants of success” 
and our interpretation and reliance upon those “deficiencies” are indeed traceable to racism. 
111 As social scientists they may deliberately understate their commitment to equality in order not 
to appear “biased.”  That scientists feel they must take care to be seen as “neutral” on the normative 
question of racial equality in order to maintain their credibility as scientists is itself a commentary on 
the continued salience and legitimacy of the ideology of white supremacy.  One might ask why 
“neutral” equals “no position on racism” while an avowed anti-racist stance is seen as partisan?   
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that there is no racism to worry about except the racism of the 
integrationist who would dare to notice race. 
IV.  HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE “FLOOD BEFORE THE FLOOD” 
The white people got out, most of them, anyway. If 
television and newspaper images can be deemed a statistical 
sample, it was mostly black people who were left behind. 
Poor black people, growing more hungry, sick and frightened 
by the hour as faraway officials counseled patience and 
warned that rescues take time.  What a shocked world saw 
exposed in New Orleans two years ago wasn't just a broken 
levee. It was a cleavage of race and class, at once familiar 
and startlingly new, laid bare in a setting where they 
suddenly amounted to matters of life and death.112  
I watched the news in stunned silence that first night after the storm.  
Men, women, children, elderly people, too infirm to walk, newborn babies 
were stranded on a freeway bridge above the water, within sight of the 
Superdome, but unable to get there.  They cried out to television cameras 
and reporters, pleading for water and food.  An old woman sat on the curb 
beside her dead husband’s body and told of how he had died while she 
begged passing police cars to stop and help them.  Every face on that 
freeway bridge was black, and I felt sick to my stomach with the 
knowledge that this human suffering was not just the random horror of 
natural disaster.113 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the flood in New Orleans, 
we witnessed just how deeply race divides our nation.  And our response, 
as evidenced by our action, our inaction, our explanations and 
justifications, is evidence of “cultural meaning”—of how we think about 
racism, equal protection, and the meaning and relevance of intent. 
A Gallup poll taken in the wake of Katrina found that six in ten 
African Americans believed that the fact that most hurricane victims were 
poor and black was one factor behind the failure of the federal government 
to come to their rescue quickly.  Nearly nine in ten non-Hispanic whites 
                                                                                                                          
112 Jason DeParle, Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers,, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1 , available 
at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
113 For critical essays on the social implications of the disaster and the deeper forces of structural 
racism and social inequality that caused the poor and people of color to suffer disproportionately, see 
generally THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE 
KATRINA (Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds. 2006); WHAT LIES BENEATH: KATRINA, RACE, 
AND THE STATE OF THE NATION (South End Press Collective ed. 2007); AFTER THE STORM: BLACK 
INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA (David Dante Trout ed. 2007). 
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believed those were not factors.114 
President Bush on his first visit to New Orleans after the hurricane 
denied that race played a role.  “[M]y attitude is this,” he said, “The storm 
didn’t discriminate and neither will the recovery effort.  When those Coast 
Guard choppers . . . were pulling people off roofs, they didn’t check the 
color of a person’s skin.”115  But, for example, Rae Clifton, who is black 
and was among those surveyed, displayed a widely held belief about the 
impact of race on the administration’s handling of the disaster.  “If it had 
been a 17-year-old white cheerleader who was caught in the water, 
somebody would have tried to get there faster,” she said.116   
I was teaching a class in Constitutional Law during the week following 
Katrina.  The readings I had assigned for the day included the landmark 
case of Washington v. Davis and The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection.  
At the beginning of the class, I read the reactions from President Bush and 
Ms. Clifton quoted above. 
“I want you to keep this exchange in mind as we consider Washington 
v. Davis, Arlington Heights and McCleskey v. Kemp,” I said.  “I want you 
to keep in mind the images we’ve seen from New Orleans and ask what 
implication they have for how we should think about race and equal 
protection.” 
I asked my students to consider if the disagreement between President 
Bush and Ms. Clifton, about whether the guys pulling people off roofs 
were racist, was asking the wrong question.  I asked, “Of what relevance to 
equal protection analysis is the fact that when the Gallup Poll asked about 
the people shown taking goods from stores in the aftermath of the storm, 
whites by a margin of 50% to 44% said most of those involved were 
criminals taking advantage of a situation, but blacks by a margin of 77% to 
16% said they were mostly desperate people trying to find a way to 
survive?”117 
Of what relevance is New Orleans’s complex racial history?  What 
about the extreme levels of poverty, the highly segregated neighborhoods, 
the failing schools, the deteriorated infrastructure and housing, the 
undernourished children, the thousands of residents with no access to 
health care and basic public services,118 that awaited Katrina before she 
                                                                                                                          
114 Susan Page & Maria Puente, Views of Whites, Blacks Differ Starkly on Disaster, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 13, 2005, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File. 
115 Transcript, President Bush in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File. 
116 Page & Puente, supra note 114. 
117 Id.  For an analysis of how racial images “framed” the stories and “facts” reported about 
Hurricane Katrina and gave them meaning, see Cheryl Harris & Devon Carbado, Loot or Find: Fact or 
Frame, in AFTER THE STORM, supra note 110, at 87, 87–88. 
118 See Evangeline Franklin, A New Kind of Medical Disaster in the United States, in THERE IS 
NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER, supra note 110, at 1, 3. 
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came ashore—what Mari Matsuda has called “the flood before the 
flood”?119  How is this storm related to our collective racism, conscious 
and unconscious? 
What was “the flood before the flood” in Seattle, Washington and 
Louisville, Kentucky? How and why were the schools segregated in the 
first place?  What messages are conveyed to the world about the children 
who attend those schools?  When we picture the children in the segregated 
all black schools, do they look like Little Black Sambo?  Is this the picture 
that causes white families to flee with their children to white suburbs and 
private schools?120  Does this picture tell us that these children are less 
intelligent, more violent, less precious, vulnerable and worthy of our care?  
Is this why we allow their school buildings to deteriorate and crumble 
around them?  Is this why we believe they can only learn when we dumb-
down the curriculum and teach them to chant scripted answers and ask no 
questions?121  Do the black and brown children who hear and see these 
messages all around them understand that they are Little Black Sambo?  
Does it “affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be 
undone”?122  When this message, that black and brown children are 
inferior, is no longer written into the laws, when no school board acts with 
conscious intent to send the message, when a federal district court issues 
an order holding that a school district has achieved “unitary status,”123 is 
                                                                                                                          
119 Mari J. Matsuda, The Flood: Political Economy and Disaster, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 
(2007). 
120 See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 1368–75 (discussing the often unacknowledged fears that 
cause white and middle class black parents to flee predominantly black urban schools); see also supra 
note 15. 
121 See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Who is the Child Left Behind?: The Racial Meaning of 
the New School Reform, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 699 (2006) (discussing the ways in which the No 
Child Left Behind Act perpetuates and reinforces social class hierarchies and racist beliefs and 
practices).   
I want to make a larger point about the continuing segregation in American 
education.  Not only do we teach children in different schools, separated by race, 
class, and how much money we spend; we also teach them differently. . . .  We have 
different expectations, aspirations, and goals.  We are educating them for different 
futures.  We send them different messages about their value to us, to the world, and 
to themselves. 
Id. at 712–13. 
122 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953). 
123 Building upon the principles articulated in Brown, the Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions in the 1960s forcing school districts to integrate public schools and create unitary school 
systems.  See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Macklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. 
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).  Decades later, the Rehnquist Court betrayed this commitment 
to the Court’s decision in Brown through a radical reinterpretation of when schools are said to have 
achieved “unitary status.”  See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237 (1991).  Recent decisions relieve school districts of the burden of proving that segregated 
schools are not the result of past discrimination and require only good faith compliance with a court’s 
desegregation order and the elimination of the harm of past discrimination “to the extent practicable.”  
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250; see also The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern 
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the meaning of the message any less clear?  Do these messages and their 
meaning provide evidence of the continued vitality of white supremacy and 
substantiate our legal and moral duty to continue to affirmatively act to 
disestablish slavery’s legacy? 
These are the questions I want my students to ask.  They are the 
questions that I hoped my article would provoke and that the best critical 
scholars in law and science have asked and continue to ask.  This is the 
conversation we must have if we are to save our nation and our souls.  If 
my effort of twenty years ago to save my own sanity has advanced this 
conversation even one small step, I am deeply gratified and thankful.  
EPILOGUE 
In the weeks before this Symposium went to press, a political 
controversy placed the issue of race at the middle of the presidential 
primary campaign and threatened to derail the candidacy of Senator Barack 
Obama, a man whom many believe may well become our nation’s first 
African American president.  The texts and context of the controversy tell 
a story that captures, in its full complexity, the essential lesson of The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection.  I close this retrospective with a brief 
reflection on those events.  
The Reverend Jeremiah Wright is angry about racism.  He is angry 
about American violence, about the thousands of precious lives lost in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Chicago neighborhood where he lives and 
serves as Pastor of the 10,000 member Trinity United Church of Christ.  
Jeremiah Wright speaks forthrightly about his anger with injustice.  For 
thirty-six years he has spoken from his pulpit, following the prophetic 
tradition of his Old Testament namesake, giving voice to the injury and 
anger of his flock and calling all of us to account for our sins against God 
and our neighbors.124  In the black church vernacular, he “makes it plain.”  
                                                                                                                          
School Segregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071 (2004).  Moreover, they hold that 
once a school system has reached “unitary status” the desegregation order should be dissolved.  See 
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (“Such decrees . . . are not intended to operate in perpetuity.”).  The Court in 
PICS adopted this radical view of “unitary status” and went one step further.  The Court held that once 
a school district has achieved “unitary status” it is actually unconstitutional for the district to continue 
the integration plan it designed to comply with the prior desegregation order.  See PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 
2752 (“Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status it had remedied the constitutional wrong that 
allowed race-based assignments.  Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis.”).  
Justice Breyer’s dissent points out how the majority’s newfangled reading of “unitary status” runs 
contrary to nearly half a century of Supreme Court precedent growing out of its decision in Brown.  See 
PICS, 127 S.Ct. at 2831 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How could the plurality adopt a constitutional 
standard that would hold unconstitutional large numbers of race-conscious integration plans adopted by 
numerous school boards over the past 50 years while remaining true to this Court's desegregation 
precedent?”). 
124 Martin E. Marty who was Wright’s professor at the University of Chicago Divinity School 
writes: 
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Now he has been pushed into the glare of public scrutiny because Barack 
Obama is a member of his flock.  Opponents of Senator Obama’s 
candidacy have excerpted the most provocative and intemperate of 
Reverend Wright’s angry, plainly spoken words, circulated them widely on 
the internet, and used them to brand him “separatist,” “anti-American,” 
“anti-white,” to portray him in the stock image of an angry black man, 
rightly hated and feared.125 
Of course, Senator Obama is the primary target of these attacks on 
Reverend Wright.  Obama is called upon to denounce his pastor’s words 
                                                                                                                          
While Wright’s sermons were pastoral—my wife and I have always been awed 
to hear the Christian Gospel parsed for our personal lives—they were also prophetic.  
At the university, we used to remark, half lightheartedly, that this Jeremiah was 
trying to live up to his namesake, the seventh-century B.C. prophet.  Though 
Jeremiah of old did not “curse” his people of Israel, Wright, as a biblical scholar, 
could point out that the prophets Hosea and Micah did. But the Book of Jeremiah, 
written by numbers of authors, is so full of blasts and quasi curses—what biblical 
scholars call “imprecatory topoi”—that New England preachers invented a sermonic 
form called “the jeremiad,” a style revived in some Wrightian shouts.  
In the end, however, Jeremiah was the prophet of hope, and that note of hope is 
what attracts the multi-class membership at Trinity and significant television 
audiences.  Both Jeremiahs gave the people work to do: to advance the missions of 
social justice and mercy that improve the lot of the suffering.  For a sample, read 
Jeremiah 29, where the prophet's letter to the exiles in Babylon exhorts them to 
settle down and “seek the peace and prosperity of the city to which I have carried 
you into exile.”  Or listen to many a Jeremiah Wright sermon. 
Martin E. Marty, Prophet and Pastor, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 11, 2008, at B1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, CHEDUC File.. 
125 See, e.g., Richard Cohen, On Wright, What Took Obama So Long?, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, 
Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/03/on_wright_what_obama_so_l.html 
(“Why did Barack Obama take so long to ‘reject outright’ the harshly critical statements about America 
made by his minister, Jeremiah Wright, not to mention the praise the same minister lavished on Louis 
Farrakhan just last November?”); Jodi Kantor, Pastor’s Words Still Draw Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2008, at A18, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“[D]espite Mr. Obama’s past attempts to 
distance himself from the harshest language, critics continued to question whether Mr. Wright’s 
statements reflect Mr. Obama’s beliefs.”); William M. Welch, Obama’s Ties To Minister May Be A 
‘Big Problem,’ Some Say Senator Has Rejected Racial Comments, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2008, at 4A, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File (“Critics say Obama may not have ended the 
controversy because he has had a relationship with Wright for nearly two decades.”).  One might well 
ask why Rev. Wright was so easily cast in this role.  Wright volunteered for the Marine Corps during 
the Vietnam War and received several White House commendations.  He holds a degree from one of 
the country’s most prestigious universities, has received several honorary doctorates, and served as a 
faculty member at several seminaries.  His church is known in Chicago for its hospitality, for its 
devotion to physical and spiritual healing, and for education and active involvement in the civic life of 
Chicago.  White guests to Trinity report that they are welcomed and embraced when they worship 
there.  Why do his calls for America to confront its violence and history of oppression translate into 
“He hates us”?  Obama reminds his audience that segregation may be one explanation for why white 
people found Wright’s words so shocking while most black people did not: 
The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of reverend 
Wright’s sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour 
in American life occurs on Sunday morning. 
Senator Barack Obama, Remarks in Philadelphia, Penn.: A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.barackobama.com/2008/03/18/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_53.php. 
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and disown the man.126  If he won’t, he is anti-American and anti-white.  
He becomes the angry black man.  Faced with this racist image-making, 
with the demand that he publicly denounce black anger and implicitly 
accept the demand’s premise that black anger is unwarranted, Obama 
delivers a speech on the subject of race.127   
Obama’s speech is wonderful.  I listen as each sentence unfolds, 
admiring his intelligence, his eloquence, his presence, worrying about how 
he will frame the next difficult issue and smiling to myself with admiration 
and pride as he chooses just the right word, metaphor, or story to capture 
the full complexity and spirit of the truth he must tell.  I am watching 
Obama stand before the nation, breaking the taboo against speaking out 
loud about our racism.  This is the speech I’ve wanted him to give since the 
beginning of the campaign.  He asks us to confront our racism, to 
acknowledge its roots in our nation’s history,128 to remember and 
                                                                                                                          
126 See, e.g., Tom Baldwin, Obama Is Urged To Disown Pastor Who Denounced America As 
Racist, THE TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 15, 2008, at 55, available at LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File; 
Cohen, supra note 125; Welch, supra note 125.  This was not the only attempt to portray Obama as the 
dangerous black man by associating him with another black man whose words and images strike fear 
into the hearts of most whites.  Obama was also criticized for not rejecting the support of Louis 
Farrakhan with enough force.  See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Obama’s Farrakhan Test, WASH. POST, Jan. 
15, 2008, at A13, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.  Attempting to make this point, 
Senator Clinton said in a televised debate: “[T]here’s a difference between denouncing and  
rejecting . . . . I just think, we’ve got to be even stronger.  We cannot let anyone in any way say these 
things, because of the implications they have, which can be so far reaching.”  Responding, Obama 
memorably quipped: “I have to say, I don’t see a difference between denouncing and rejecting . . . . But 
if the word ‘reject’ Senator Clinton thinks is stronger than the word ‘denounce,’ then I’m happy to 
concede the point, and I would reject and denounce.”  The Democratic Debate In Cleveland, in N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/us/politics/26text-
debate.html? 
pagewanted=all). 
127 Obama’s speech is delivered in Philadelphia across the street from the hall where the 
Constitution’s framers gathered to write the nation’s foundational document.  His title, “A More Perfect 
Union,” echoes the Constitution’s preamble, and his opening paragraph reminds his audience that the 
perfection of our union is unfinished business for which we are responsible.  This theme echoes my 
own position on bottom-up Constitutional construction.  See Lawrence, Forbidden Conversations, 
supra note 16, at 1398 (arguing that constitutional interpretation involves our “engaging in a 
conversation about public morality and the values we hold collectively as a community, about the way 
we choose to constitute ourselves as a people”); Charles R. Lawrence III, Promises to Keep: We are the 
Constitution’s Framers, 1987 HOW. L.J. 645 (arguing that the Constitution “includes us—all of us—
that it calls upon each of us to be active participants in making the Constitution; in deciding which 
constitutional values will be given primacy”). 
128 Speaking of the Framers of the Constitution who had gathered in there in Philadelphia in 1787, 
Obama said:  
The document they produced was eventually signed but ultimately unfinished. It 
was stained by this nation’s original sin of slavery, a question that divided the 
colonies and brought the convention to a stalemate until the founders chose to allow 
the slave trade to continue for at least twenty more years, and to leave any final 
resolution to future generations.   
Of course, the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our 
Constitution—a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship 
under the law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a 
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appreciate the sacrifice and bravery of parents and grandparents who 
struggled to narrow the gap between our nation’s ideals and our legacy of 
slavery and Jim Crow,129 to know that this legacy lives with us still.  He 
wants us to understand that we share this history and the illness it has 
wrought,130 to use our knowledge and understanding to heal ourselves of 
the disease of racism.   It hardly seems possible.131  Barack Obama has 
made the subject of my life’s work the subject of his speech.   
Once again, I am aware that I do not watch this speech alone, that 
millions of other Americans are hearing this text and giving it meaning.132  
Like the text in Little Black Sambo and the text of the of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools, Senator 
Obama’s speech is filled with racial images and I watch the speech 
                                                                                                                          
union that could be and should be perfected over time.  
Obama, supra note 125. 
129 Speaking of the great, long struggle and those who sacrificed to work towards the promise of 
our Constitution, Obama says: 
And yet words on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves from 
bondage, or provide men and women of every color and creed their full rights and 
obligations as citizens of the United States.  What would be needed were Americans 
in successive generations who were willing to do their part—through protests and 
struggle, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war and civil disobedience 
and always at great risk—to narrow that gap between the promise of our ideals and 
the reality of their time. 
Id. 
130 Obama does not say that “we are all racists,” as I have said, Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection, supra note 7, at 322, or that structural racism remains and is justified by racist 
ideology, see supra notes 17, 23–24, 35–36 and accompanying text, but that is his clear meaning.  
Consider when he says:  
Understanding this reality requires a reminder of how we arrived at this point. As 
William Faulkner once wrote, “The past isn't dead and buried. In fact, it isn't even 
past.”  We do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice in this country.  
But we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist in the 
African-American community today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on 
from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim 
Crow. 
Obama, supra note 125. 
131 My predisposition to disbelief does not come from an earlier conviction that Obama did not 
previously believe what he now speaks.  Rather, I could not imagine that Obama could say these things 
as a serious contender for the presidency.  Until this time, he had seldom spoken directly about issues 
of race or racism. Of course, his blackness spoke always of race but it was others who made his 
blackness an issue.  
132 Obama’s speech instantly became one of the most popular videos on YouTube and has, as of 
April 4, 2008, been viewed more than four million times on that site.  See YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=obama+philadelphia+race&search_type= (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2008) (noting that Obama’s speech entitled “A More Perfect Union” has been viewed over four 
million times); see also Speech on Race Tops YouTube, NPR, Mar. 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88650809 (reporting that as of March 20, 2008, 
Obama’s speech had been clicked more than 1.6 million times and had been commented on more than 
four thousand times).  This, coupled with the sound bites played on the television and radio news 
networks, brought his words to an unprecedented audience, especially for a primary season campaign 
speech. 
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knowing that our collective history and experience will give those images 
meaning.  I know that the images we will see and the meanings we will 
take from this text are determined not only by the text itself, but by the face 
of the speaker.   
One cannot mistake Barack Obama for anything other than a black 
man.  The Media has dubbed him a “post-racial” candidate.133  When a 
euphoric multiracial crowd of Obama campaign workers and supporters 
gathered to celebrate his historic victory in the South Carolina primary 
they chanted: “Race doesn’t matter!”134  But race does matter in America, 
Supreme Court pronouncements of our colorblindness notwithstanding.  
Obama’s candidacy compels us to ask, “Are we capable of electing a Black 
president?  Are we capable of overcoming and moving beyond our 
racism?”  We cannot answer those questions in the affirmative while we 
deny our racism. 
Even as I rejoice in the truth and eloquence of Obama’s words, I 
experience uneasiness and apprehension.  I am fearful that he has spoken 
too much truth, too forthrightly; that even this carefully crafted speech will 
produce the backlash that always comes when one speaks truth to power.135  
Within hours of the speech, a host of pundits and commentators descend 
on his words, eager to dissect, analyze, reinterpret, assault and condemn.  
Many of these commentators lift passages from Obama’s speech and 
reframe them to distort his meaning and silence his truth.136  They seek to 
                                                                                                                          
133 See The Cook Spoils Obama’s Broth: Race and the Democrats, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2008, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File (“Mr. Obama’s candidacy at first seemed a post-racial 
triumph.”); Peter J. Boyer, The Political Scene: The Color of Politics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at 
38, available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWYRK File (discussing Obama and Newark Mayor Gary 
Booker as two African American politicians who transcend race); Tim Rutten, The Good Generation 
Gap, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at 31, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (reporting that “he 
personifies and articulates the post-racial America in which most of our young people now live”).  See 
contra Gary Younge, Some Things Even Obama Can’t Transcend, THE NATION, Feb. 11, 2008, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080211/younge (“[B]efore we can talk sensibly about 
transcending difference, we must first transform the conditions that give these differences meaning.”). 
134 See Alec MacGillis, A Margin That Will Be Hard to Marginalize, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2008, 
at A01, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. 
135 See Mari Matsuda, Love Change, 17 J.L. & FEMINISM 185, 187 n.10 (2005) (pointing out that 
some commentators attributed Senator Kerry’s loss in the 2004 presidential election to a backlash 
against Democrats for their modest support of civil unions, and making the case for persisting in the 
fight for the marriage rights of all people—the risk of political backlash notwithstanding); Cynthia 
Tucker, King’s Courage Should Not Be Reduced To Caricature, Yahoo! News, Mar. 29, 2008, 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ucas/20080329/cm_ucas/kingscourageshouldnotbereducedtocaricature 
(quoting Martin Luther King, Jr. as saying, “The most popular explanation for the backlash is that it is a 
response to Negro ‘aggressiveness’ and ‘excessive demands.’  It is further attributed to an overzealous 
government which is charged with so favoring Negro demands that it has stimulated them beyond 
reason.  These are largely half-truths and, as such, whole lies.”). 
136 See, e.g., William Kristol, Let’s Not, And Say We Did, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A23, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYTIMES File (“Nor was I shocked when Obama compared 
Reverend Wright, who was using his pulpit to propagate racial resentment, with his grandmother, who 
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break the bridge of shared humanity that Obama has labored so mightily to 
build in his campaign and in this speech.  They signal to white people, 
“This man Obama is not you.  Remember he is black and black folks are 
not us.”  They do this in the coded language of colorblindness, a language 
that invokes racism’s images even as it denies racism’s existence or 
attributes racism only to those who dare remove white supremacy’s 
colorblind disguise. They never say Obama is scary because he is black.  
Instead, they use Jeremiah Wright, with his afro-centric robes and 
unguarded angry words, to re-cast Obama as scarily black.  Obama’s 
answer was to confront the image, to say our history has made blackness 
scary.  The image of blackness as violent, angry, hateful, is not true.  Now 
the truth-silencers strike back by telling the lie again and again, calling 
Wright, now Obama’s surrogate, white-hating and separatist.  The 
commentators position themselves as colorblind and Wright (now Obama) 
becomes the separatist who is racist.  Like Justice Roberts in PICS, they 
turn reality upside-down, denying the existence of white supremacy’s 
structure and meaning in order to silence those who exhort us to be 
conscious of our racism so that we can heal ourselves. 
The day after Obama gives his speech I present and discuss this Article 
with my colleagues at a works-in-progress seminar.  The racism at the core 
                                                                                                                          
may have said privately a few things that made Obama cringe, or with Geraldine Ferraro, whom ‘some 
have dismissed . . . as harboring some deep-seated bias.’”); see also The Daily Show, The Dialogue 
Begins, Mar. 19, 2008, available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId 
=164521&title=the-dialogue-begins (lampooning the cable network news’ coverage of Obama’s speech 
and their penchant to, in Obama’s words, “tackle race only as spectacle”).  Obama anticipated this 
backlash and warned of it in his speech, calling on Americans to resist this old brand of politics by 
division: 
For we have a choice in this country.  We can accept a politics that breeds 
division, and conflict, and cynicism.  We can tackle race only as spectacle—as we 
did in the OJ trial—or in the wake of tragedy, as we did in the aftermath of 
Katrina—or as fodder for the nightly news.  We can play Reverend Wright’s 
sermons on every channel, every day and talk about them from now until the 
election, and make the only question in this campaign whether or not the American 
people think that I somehow believe or sympathize with his most offensive words.  
We can pounce on some gaffe by a Hillary supporter as evidence that she’s playing 
the race card, or we can speculate on whether white men will all flock to John 
McCain in the general election regardless of his policies.  
We can do that.  
But if we do, I can tell you that in the next election, we’ll be talking about some 
other distraction.  And then another one.  And then another one.  And nothing will 
change.   
That is one option.  Or, at this moment, in this election, we can come together 
and say, “Not this time.”  This time we want to talk about the crumbling schools that 
are stealing the future of black children and white children and Asian children and 
Hispanic children and Native American children.  This time we want to reject the 
cynicism that tells us that these kids can’t learn; that those kids who don’t look like 
us are somebody else's problem.  The children of America are not those kids, they 
are our kids, and we will not let them fall behind in a 21st century economy.  Not 
this time.  
Obama, supra note 125. 
 2008] UNCONSCIOUS RACISM REVISITED 975 
of the attack on Obama is the new shared text I ask my colleagues to 
confront.  I ask them to consider the challenge that Obama faces when he 
makes this speech, when he asks us to confront and heal our racism, even 
as we suffer from the disease, even while there are those who seek to feed 
the cancer, even as he stands surrounded by the images that racism has 
created. 
I begin my presentation by showing several visual images. The first is 
a drawing of Little Black Sambo.  The image comes from the cover of the 
1899 London edition of the book.  In the slides that follow there are several 
other iconic images of Black people as America has imagined us:  a white 
minstrel in blackface; a cartoon caricature of a black uniformed waiter with 
huge distorted red lips in a wide smile, the restaurant’s name printed on his 
white teeth—“Coon-chicken Inn;” advertisements for Aunt Jemima 
Pancakes and Rastus Cream of Wheat; a photograph of Flavor Flav—a 
contemporary minstrel in clownish garb.  Interspersed among these images 
I have placed a photograph of myself from the Georgetown web site, a 
photograph of the Reverend Jeremiah Wright wearing afro-centric 
vestments, and a photograph of Barack Obama taken as he delivered his 
speech in Philadelphia.  I want my colleagues to see that these images 
stand beside Barack Obama nearly blocking our ability to see him as he is, 
in his intelligence, and empathetic generosity toward his audience, asking 
Americans to hear our history and know the truth of our racism.  The 
picture of my face among the others signals that these images also stand 
with me as I speak.   
Obama’s foes have used Jeremiah Wright to remind us that all of these 
images represent Obama’s kin.  They deploy these images so that we will 
feel their presence without knowing they are there, without asking why 
their presence makes Obama less human, less one of us.  I want to expose 
the images, to make my colleagues conscious of the cultural meaning 
found in the demand that Obama denounce his pastor, a meaning that we 
have pushed into our unconscious.  I want them to hear how Obama 
responds to his foes, knowing he must speak directly to the images if he is 
to prove them false. 
I read the following passage from Obama’s speech. 
Like other predominantly black churches across the 
country, Trinity embodies the black community in its 
entirety—the doctor and the welfare mom, the model student 
and the former gang-banger.  Like other black churches, 
Trinity's services are full of raucous laughter and sometimes 
bawdy humor.  They are full of dancing, clapping, screaming 
and shouting that may seem jarring to the untrained ear.  The 
church contains in full the kindness and cruelty, the fierce 
intelligence and the shocking ignorance, the struggles and 
successes, the love and yes, the bitterness and bias that make 
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up the black experience in America.  
And this helps explain, perhaps, my relationship with 
Reverend Wright.  As imperfect as he may be, he has been 
like family to me.  He strengthened my faith, officiated my 
wedding, and baptized my children.  Not once in my 
conversations with him have I heard him talk about any 
ethnic group in derogatory terms, or treat whites with whom 
he interacted with anything but courtesy and respect.  He 
contains within him the contradictions—the good and the 
bad—of the community that he has served diligently for so 
many years.  
I can no more disown him than I can disown the black 
community.  I can no more disown him than I can my white 
grandmother—a woman who helped raise me, a woman who 
sacrificed again and again for me, a woman who loves me as 
much as she loves anything in this world, but a woman who 
once confessed her fear of black men who passed by her on 
the street, and who on more than one occasion has uttered 
racial or ethnic stereotypes that made me cringe.  
These people are a part of me.  And they are a part of 
America, this country that I love.137  
Obama understands the racial message and meaning in the demand that 
he disassociate himself from Reverend Wright.  He knows that this demand 
is about more than his pastor’s intemperate words.  Obama refuses to 
disown Jeremiah Wright or the community of black people.138  He says I 
                                                                                                                          
137 Id. 
138 Although Obama did not disown Reverend Wright or his anger at injustice, he did distance 
himself from Wright’s comments calling them “wrong” and “divisive” and characterizing them as 
expressing “a profoundly distorted view of this country—a view that sees white racism as  
endemic . . . .”  I found this troubling.  For in distancing himself from Wright’s words, Obama appeared 
to deny the substance of Wright’s meaning as well as the words that Wright had chosen.  Obama’s 
detractors were demanding that he disown his kinship with his pastor and Obama refused, but they 
were also demanding that he distance himself from the more radical content of Wright’s words and 
Obama seemed to accede to this demand.  These two different responses represent the tightrope that 
Obama, the presidential candidate, is forced to walk.  He cannot use the words “white supremacy” as I 
have in this Article.  He must speak of our shared racism in a way that his audience can hear him.  He 
can embrace his pastor, but he must be careful about embracing his pastor’s radicalism. 
Obama’s opponents have employed another image in seeking to render him silent in the face of 
racism.  They have used his Muslim heritage to evoke a racialized image of adherents of Islam.  See 
Maureen Dowd, What’s in a Name, Barry?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A15, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File; Adam Freedman, The Object of His Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at 
11, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing Clinton’s call for Obama to “reject” as 
well as “denounce” Farrakhan); Joe Garafoli, Right Wing Plays Muslim Card Against Obama, SAN. 
FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/ 
a/2008/02/28/MNKGVABG8.DTL&hw=right+wing&sn=007&sc=637; Jim Kuhnhen, Obama Fights 
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am one of these people, too. We are not as white supremacy imagines us 
and neither are you.  We cannot ignore the continuing legacy of a nation 
born in slavery.  We cannot deny the existence of our segregated schools, 
neighborhoods, and churches.  We cannot ignore the images that stand 
beside me as I speak. These images stand here with me, and we must see 
them clearly before we can understand the injury they do.  This work of 
coming face to face with our racism and reconstructing our images of each 
other and ourselves is the unfinished business of forming a more perfect 
union.  
I began this reflection on The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection with a 
text that felt like a nightmare and made me despair.  The Supreme Court 
majority in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District had turned Brown v. Board of Education on its head, declaring it 
unconstitutional for us to see our racism, to speak of it out loud, to make it 
visible so that we can fight it together.  I close with a text both hopeful and 
difficult.  A text from a black presidential candidate who challenges us to 
see the cultural meaning that white supremacy has constructed, to see it so 
that we can begin the work of reconstructing those meanings and our 
shared humanity.  We must choose the latter text, with our eyes and hearts 
open, and do this difficult work that will make our wounded world whole. 
                                                                                                                          
Rumors About Islam, Senator Rejects Farrakhan; Says Repeatedly He Is a Christian, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Feb. 28, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, CHRGAZ File.  The silencing 
power of this image is apparent in Obama’s exclusion of Muslims from his truth speaking and inclusive 
lesson on American racism.  In the same paragraph that he distances himself from Wright’s words, he 
makes his only reference to Islam saying that Wright’s remarks expressed a view “that sees the 
conflicts in the Middle East as rooted primarily in the actions of stalwart allies like Israel, instead of 
emanating from the perverse and hateful ideologies of Islam.”  Obama, supra note 125.  Here, Obama 
might have taught the same lesson he taught in countering the racialized images of blackness by 
invoking Reverend Wright’s full humanity and explaining his anger within the context of the black 
experience with oppressive racism.  Instead, Obama participates in the post 9/11 racialized imagery that 
equates Islam with terrorism and renders all Muslims terrorists in our eyes.  As my colleague Professor 
Lama Abu Odeh has noted, “While Obama explains black rage to white Americans, he completely fails 
to explain Muslim rage to Americans.  In a post-9/11 world, we Muslims are way too hot to touch and 
he drops us as surely as he has dropped his middle name Hussein.”  Lama Abu-Odeh, Remarks at a 
Georgetown University Law Center Panel Discussion Titled “Perfecting the Union: Obama, Race, and 
Religion” (Apr. 7, 2008) (on file with author). 
